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TRIBAL SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY
AND SELF-REGULATION OF HEALTH
CARE SERVICES: THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK AND THE SWINOMISH
TRIBE’S DENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM
GEOFFREY D. STROMMER, STARLA K. ROELS, AND CAROLINE P. MAYHEW*
I. INTRODUCTION
Across the United States, an important shift is taking place in the Indian
health care arena. Over the past forty years, many American Indian Tribes have
transitioned away from relying primarily on federal officials to provide a bare
minimum in health care services to Indian people and have begun instead to develop and operate complex tribal health care delivery systems that offer the highest level of health care possible.1 Health care has historically been considered,
and remains today, a core component of the federal trust responsibility to Indians.2 However, that trust responsibility is increasingly being carried out through
the transfer of resources and authority from federal agencies to Tribes to assume
control and responsibility to design, implement, and provide direct programs and
services that are better tailored to local tribal needs.3 This federal policy of supporting tribal sovereignty and tribal self-determination generally has indeed fostered and encouraged the development of a new, robust tribal health care system.4
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1. See discussion infra Section II.C.
2. See discussion infra Section II.B.
3. See discussion infra Section II.C.
4. See discussion infra Part IV.
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To date, this new health care system has largely developed and evolved
within the framework of existing federal health care and Indian law.5 More recently, some Tribes have begun to use their inherent tribal sovereign authority to
innovate and expand the services they provide to Indian people beyond the services that might otherwise be available under state or federal law.6 This article
will examine the historical backdrop against which the modern Indian health system has developed; describe the current legal framework that allows tribes to
exercise tribal sovereign authority to provide and regulate health care services
under tribal law; and discuss—as a concrete example—how these legal authorities have been used to make available much needed dental care to Indians who
reside near the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community in Washington State.
II. HISTORICAL BACKDROP
A. Origins of the Federal Responsibility for Indian Health Care
In permanently reauthorizing the Indian Health Care Improvement Act in
2010,7 Congress cited the federal government’s need to fulfill its “special trust
responsibilities and legal obligations to Indians”8 and declared that “Federal
health services to maintain and improve the health of the Indians are consonant
with and required by the Federal Government’s historical and unique legal relationship with, and resulting responsibility to, the American Indian people.”9 The
trust responsibilities and legal obligations cited by Congress reflect the dual concepts of federal supremacy over Indian affairs and a general federal-tribal “trust
relationship” that together provide the legal, moral, and political justification for
numerous federal services and programs for Indians, from education to housing
to health care to many others.10 The roots of the federal trust duty can be traced

5. See discussion infra Sections II.C, IV.
6. See discussion infra Part IV.
7. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10221(a), 124 Stat. 119, 935–
36 (2010) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (Supp. IV 2016)).
8. S. Res. 1790, 111th Cong. § 103 (2009) (enacted).
9. Indian Health Care Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 94-437, § 2, 90 Stat. 1400, 1400 (1976) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. IV 2016)).
10. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 7401 (Supp. IV 2016) (“It is the policy of the United States to fulfill the
Federal Government’s unique and continuing trust relationship with and responsibility to the Indian people for the education of Indian children.”); 25 U.S.C. § 4101(2), (4) (Supp. IV 2016) (“[T]here exists a
unique relationship between the Government of the United States and the governments of Indian tribes
and a unique Federal responsibility to Indian people . . . the Congress, through treaties, statutes, and the
general course of dealing with Indian tribes, has assumed a trust responsibility for the protection and
preservation of Indian tribes and for working with tribes and their members to improve their housing
conditions and socioeconomic status so that they are able to take greater responsibility for their own economic condition . . . .’”); 25 U.S.C. § 1901(2)–(3) (Supp. IV 2016) (“Congress, through statutes, treaties,
and the general course of dealing with Indian tribes, has assumed the responsibility for the protection and
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to treaties, statutes, and judicial decisions from the earliest days of the Republic,
and, along with the notion of plenary and exclusive federal power, has evolved
to become one of the bedrock principles of our modern federal Indian policy.11
Another of these bedrock principles is the federal acknowledgment of retained
inherent tribal sovereignty and the resulting right of tribes to exercise sovereign
authority over their own lands and people.12
Before the United States Constitution was even adopted, the Confederation
Congress outlined an early vision of United States Indian policy in the Northwest
Ordinance, which established a government and certain laws for the newly created Northwest Territory.13 The Northwest Ordinance called for “[t]he utmost
good faith” toward Indians and respect for their land and property rights; affirmed that their “rights, property, and liberty” should not be disturbed; and declared that “laws founded in justice and humanity, shall from time to time be
made for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and
friendship with them.”14 Though not always borne out in practice, as the often
gruesome history of the United States shows, this sentiment nevertheless sowed
the early seeds of a consistently acknowledged (if aspirational) feature of our
federal Indian policy: a good faith duty, with both moral and legal dimensions,
toward Indian peoples as such that includes the recognition of tribal authority
and self-determination.15
Two months after the Northwest Ordinance was enacted by the Continental
Congress, the United States Constitution was signed. That document lay the

preservation of Indian tribes and their resources . . . there is no resource that is more vital to the continued
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and that the United States has a direct interest,
as trustee, in protecting Indian children who are members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe . . . .”); 25 U.S.C. § 3701(2) (Supp. IV 2016) (“[T]he United States has a trust responsibility to protect, conserve, utilize, and manage Indian agricultural lands consistent with its fiduciary obligation and its
unique relationship with Indian tribes . . . .”).
11. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §§ 5.02[1], [2], 5.04[3][a] (Nell Jessup Newton
et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK] (explaining that “courts have recognized that Congress has ‘plenary and exclusive authority’ over Indian affairs” and have defined the trust relationship
between the federal government and Indian tribes).
12. Id. § 4.01[1][a] (explaining that the “Constitution, legislation, treaties, judicial decisions, and
administrative practice” all recognize the inherent “tribal powers of self-government”).
13. 32 Journals of the Continental Congress 1787 334–43 (July 13, 1787) (GPO 1936).
14. Id. at 340–41 (“The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their lands
and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and, in their property, rights, and
liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress;
but laws founded in justice and humanity, shall from time to time be made for preventing wrongs being
done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them.”).
15. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 4.01[1][a] (“Perhaps the most basic principle of all
Indian law, supported by a host of [legal] decisions, is that those powers vested in an Indian nation are
not, in general, delegated power granted by express acts of Congress, but rather ‘inherent powers of a
limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.’” (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313, 322–23 (1978))).
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foundation for a continuing government-to-government relationship between Indian tribes and the United States by recognizing tribes as separate sovereigns and
by vesting exclusive authority over Indian affairs with the federal government
(as opposed to the states). Specifically, the Indian Commerce Clause grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes[.]”16 As its first order of business in
exercising its new powers over Indian affairs, the First Congress enacted the
Nonintercourse Act in 1790, forbidding any person from carrying on “any trade
or intercourse with the Indian tribes, without a license for that purpose” and prohibiting the purchase of lands from Indians or tribes without the consent of the
United States.17 Congress’ early decision under its Indian commerce clause powers to deal with Indians at the tribal level, and on a sovereign-to-sovereign basis,
was a significant one in the development of a national Indian policy.18
Congress’ acknowledgment of the government-to-government nature of Indian affairs followed naturally from the practice of treatymaking with Indian
tribes, which had begun during colonial times.19 After the Constitution was in
place, the new federal government continued to enter into bilateral treaties with
individual Indian tribes pursuant to the Article II Treaty Clause.20 At the same
time, general and specific promises made in those treaties helped to shape the
young Congress’ view of its responsibilities to Indian tribes on a national level.21
In many treaties, the United States agreed to take tribes under its “protection”
and to provide annuities or payments, goods and supplies, and various health and
educational services or resources in exchange for settlement rights to vast quantities of land and commitments of peace.22 In a 1957 report to Congress, the Public Health Service (PHS) noted:

16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
17. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137, 137–38 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (Supp.
IV 2016)).
18. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Original Understanding of the Political Status of Indian Tribes, 82
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 153, 170–72 (2008).
19. See The Avalon Project, Treaties Between the United States and Native Americans, YALE L.
SCH., http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/ntreaty.asp (last updated 2008), for a list of treaties beginning from 1778.
20. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the President the power to make treaties with the
advice and consent of the Senate).
21. See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at § 1.03[2] (“Each substantive provision of the
first Trade and Intercourse Act fulfilled an obligation previously assumed by the United States in treaties
with various tribes.”).
22. See, e.g., Treaty with the Six Nations, preamble, Oct. 22, 1784, 7 Stat. 15, 15 (“The United States
of America give peace to the Seneca’s, Mohawks, Onondagas and Cayugas, and receive them into their
protection . . . .”); Treaty with the Miamies, arts. 1, 6, Miamies-U.S., Oct. 23, 1826, 7 Stat. 300, 300–01
(“The United States agree to appropriate the sum of two thousand dollars annually, as long as Congress
may think proper, for the support of poor infirm persons of the Miami tribe, and for the education of the
youth of the said tribe; which sum shall be expended under the direction of the President of the United
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By 1871, when Congress terminated treaty-making, at least 2 dozen
treaties had provided for some kind of medical service, including an
occasional hospital. Although most of the treaties imposed time limits
of 5 to 20 years on the provision of care, the Federal Government
adopted a policy of continuing services under so-called ‘gratuity appropriations’ after the original benefit period expired.23
The origins of many of the federal service programs for Indians today, including
health care programs for Indians, can thus be traced to these treaty promises.24
The concepts of the federal trust responsibility and exclusive federal authority over Indian affairs (including the federal provision to Indians of goods
and services like health care), have thus been consistently acknowledged in the
laws and policies of the United States in some form, although that form has
evolved over time. This is perhaps most starkly apparent in historical decisions
of the Supreme Court, which has been credited as the first federal body to explicitly identify a trust responsibility as such. The Court’s early framing of the
federal-tribal relationship was overtly paternalistic and patronizing but recognized both that the federal government owed a special duty of protection to Indian people by virtue of its relationship and dealings with them and that states
lacked governing authority over Indian territory. In a case often cited as the earliest explicit recognition of a trust responsibility, Chief Justice John Marshall in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia described Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations” under the protection of the United States and whose “relation to the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”25 In a follow-up case, Worcester

States.”); Treaty with the Winnebagoes, arts. I, IV–V, U.S.-Winnebago, Sept. 15, 1832, 7 Stat. 370, 370–
72 (promising to construct a school and provide for the education of children, including clothing, board
and lodging; funds for agriculturalists, oxen, ploughs, and other agricultural implements; and “for the
services and attendance of a physician at Prairie du Chien, and of one at Fort Winnebago, each, two hundred dollars, per annum,” among other items); Treaty with the Ottawas and Chippewas, arts. 1, 4, Mar.
28, 1836, 7 Stat. 491, 491–92 (promising “[t]hree hundred dollars per annum for vaccine matter, medicines, and the services of physicians, to be continued while the Indians remain on their reservations.”);
Treaty with the Flatheads, etc., arts. I, V, Flatheads-U.S., July 16, 1855, 12 Stat. 975, 975–77 (promising
to erect a hospital, among other things, “keeping the same in repair, and provided with the necessary
medicines and furniture, and to employ a physician” for a period of 20 years); Treaty with the Klamath,
etc., arts. I, IV, Oct. 14, 1864, 16 Stat. 707, 707–09 (promising to erect and maintain a school and hospital
on the reservation for a period of twenty years); Treaty of Fort Laramie, arts. I, XIII, Apr. 29, 1868, 15
Stat. 635, 635–40 (“The United States hereby agrees to furnish annually to the Indians the physician,
teachers, carpenter, miller, engineer, farmer, and blacksmiths, as herein contemplated, and that such appropriations shall be made from time to time, on the estimate of the Secretary of the Interior, as will be
sufficient to employ such persons.”).
23. U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., HEALTH SERVICES FOR AMERICAN INDIANS 86–87 (1957).
24. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at § 1.03[1]; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (Supp. IV 2016) (“Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the general course of dealing with Indian tribes, has assumed the
responsibility for the protection and preservation of Indian tribes and their resources[.]”).
25. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). Later, in United States v. Kagama, the Supreme Court opined:
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v. Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall held that the state of Georgia could not enforce its criminal laws against non-Indians residing in Cherokee territory, writing:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws
of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have
no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or
in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress. The whole
intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States.26
The Supreme Court now recognizes greater state authority within Indian
country, particularly over non-Indians, but federal supremacy in the realm of Indian affairs and inherent tribal sovereign authority are still the law of the land.27
Additionally, over time, the federal trust responsibility has come to be recognized
as a general fiduciary duty, with the relationship compared to one between a
trustee and its beneficiary rather than a guardian and its ward, arising not because
Indian people cannot care for themselves but because the nature and history of
the relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes created certain
ongoing obligations. This federal view of the trust relationship and the federal
power that accompanies it has evolved through and is reflected in judicial decisions, Acts of Congress, and Executive Orders and other policies that,
acknowledge the special status of Indian tribes within our federal system and
establish a range of programs and services for Indians.28

From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the federal government with them, and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty
of protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the executive, and
by congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen.
118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
26. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832).
27. See infra Section III.A. Federal supremacy over Indian affairs does not mean that the states do
not retain the obligation to protect the equal rights of, and provide state services to, Indian people who are
also state residents or citizens, to the same extent as all other state residents or citizens. See COHEN’S
HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 14.02[2][d][iv] (citing cases holding that states may not deny Indians state
services on the grounds that federal services are available as an alternative). Indeed, as part of the IHCIA
reauthorization in 2010 Congress codified a “payor of last resort” provision to ensure that other federal,
state, and local programs remain responsible for payment for services provided by the Indian Health Service and tribal health programs where those other federal, state, and local programs would otherwise pay
for an individual’s care. 25 U.S.C. § 1623(b) (Supp. IV 2016).
28. See, e.g., Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Mitchell
(Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983)); see supra note 10 (listing federal statutes invoking the federal
trust responsibility); Executive Order No. 13175 of November 6, 2000: Consultation and Coordination
With Indian Tribal Governments, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000); Press Release, The White House,
Office of the Press Secretary, Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Nov. 5,
2009). In 2012, the Supreme Court noted that while the federal trust responsibility to Indian tribes is not
the same as a private trust enforceable under the common law, “The Government, following ‘a humane
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B. The Evolution of Federal Indian Health Care Programs and Responsibilities
The obligation to provide for Indian health has long been viewed by federal
policymakers as a necessary component of the federal trust responsibility.29 It
has also been viewed as a moral imperative, as well as a public health necessity,
owing to the introduction of devastating new diseases and other consequences of
colonialism with harmful impacts on Indian health. It was these latter concerns
that drove the earliest appropriations of funding specifically for Indian health
care, while the former began to take root and became more firmly entrenched
over time. In its comprehensive 1957 report to Congress on the administration of
Indian health services, the PHS noted that “[a]s early as 1802 or 1803, Army
physicians took emergency measures to curb smallpox and other contagious diseases among Indian tribes in the vicinity of military posts. Without doubt, these
measures were intended primarily to protect soldiers at the forts from infection,
but Indians benefitted.”30 In 1832, Congress directed the Secretary of War to
employ physicians to administer smallpox vaccines to Indians.31
In 1849, when the Bureau of Indian Affairs was transferred from the War
Department to the Department of the Interior, the responsibility to provide for
Indian health care was transferred along with it.32 The transfer resulted in some
increase in the scope of Indian health care services beyond emergency vaccinations and fulfillment of specific treaty promises. However, Indian health continued to be funded through patchwork legislation and from miscellaneous funds,
and the modest increase in resources that accompanied the transfer proved inadequate to the task of ensuring minimum standards of health among Indian people.33 As the PHS reported in its 1957 Report, “In 1892, Commissioner [of Indian
Affairs Thomas J.] Morgan, having repeatedly exhorted Congress ‘in the name
of humanity’ to provide money for Indian hospitals at every agency and boarding
school, described the lack of such facilities as ‘a great evil, which in my view
amounts to a national disgrace.’”34

and self imposed policy . . . has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and
trust,’ . . . obligations ‘to the fulfillment of which the national honor has been committed . . . .’” United
States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 176 (2011) (internal citations omitted) (citing Seminole
Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296–297 (1942)); Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 437
(1912)). Thus, the trust relationship and its general obligations extend across the federal government to
include every member of the legislative and executive branches, though whether any particular responsibilities enforceable as a matter of federal law exist is dependent on the context.
29. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
30. U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., HEALTH SERVICES FOR AMERICAN INDIANS 86 (1957).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 87; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1026, pt. 1, at 14 (1976).
34. U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., HEALTH SERVICES FOR AMERICAN INDIANS 87 (1957).
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Congress began appropriating general funds for Indian health care in fiscal
year 1911.35 Two years later, President Taft addressed Congress, citing a series
of surveys that revealed shockingly high rates of disease among Indians and asking Congress to increase funding for Indian health care.36 President Taft characterized his request as a requirement of the federal government’s special responsibilities to Indian tribes, stating: “As guardians of the welfare of the Indians, it
is our immediate duty to give to the race a fair chance for an unmaimed birth,
healthy childhood, and physically efficient maturity.”37 Congress did increase
the annual appropriations for Indian Health, and in 1921 passed the Snyder Act,
authorizing the Bureau of Indian Affairs to carry out programs “[f]or the relief
of distress and conservation of health[,]” among other purposes.38 The Snyder
Act provided the first statutory authorization for Indian health care programs,
though the established programs were discretionary and appropriations levels
were left for Congress to determine on an annual basis.39
In 1928, a comprehensive survey of the economic and social state of Indians
within the United States, known as the Meriam Report, revealed that the health
status of Indian people remained extremely poor.40 The Meriam Report blamed
inadequate appropriations for the lack of effectiveness of the Indian Service in
addressing Indian health care, among other issues.41 At that time, however, Indian policy favored the assimilation of Indians into the general population and
the eventual dissolution of Indian tribes as distinct political and cultural groups.42
A larger focus was therefore put on integrating Indians into the public health
system in the states and local communities where they resided. For example, in
1934, Congress passed the Johnson O’Malley Act, authorizing the Bureau of Indian Affairs to enter into agreements with states and their political subdivisions
to provide various social services including “medical attention” and “relief of

35. Act of Apr. 4, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-114, 36 Stat. 269; U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., HEALTH
SERVICES FOR AMERICAN INDIANS 88 (1957).
36. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, § 22.04[1] (quoting Diseases Among Indians, S. DOC. NO.
62-907, at 2 (2d Sess. 1911)).
37. Id.
38. 25 U.S.C. § 13 (Supp. IV 2016).
39. Betty Pfefferbaum et al., Learning How to Heal: An Analysis of the History, Policy, and Framework of Indian Health Care, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 365, 376–77 (1996) (describing how the Snyder Act
authorized Congress to control funding and discretionary programs for the benefit and care of Indian
health).
40. LEWIS MERIAM ET AL., INST. FOR GOV’T RES., THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION 189
(F. W. Powell ed., Johns Hopkins Press 1928).
41. Id. at 189.
42. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at § 1.06[1].
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distress.”43 Nevertheless, the Meriam Report recognized the unique federal responsibility to Indian tribes and urged caution in the transition of service administration, stating as a fundamental principle:
[U]nder the Constitution of the United States and in accordance with
the historical development of the country, the function of providing
for Indians is the responsibility of the national government. . . . [T]he
national government should not transfer activities incident to this
function to individual states unless and until a particular state is prepared to conduct that activity in accordance with standards at least as
high as those adopted by the national government.44
The assimilationist tone of federal Indian policy continued into the 1950s,
despite passage of the landmark Indian Reorganization Act in 1934,45 which generally encouraged the organization of tribal governments and the exercise of
greater tribal self-government. Regardless, the responsibility to provide health
care to Indians was never in fact shifted from the federal government to the states.
Rather, in 1954 Congress enacted legislation transferring the responsibility for
Indian health services to the Public Health Service, a proposal that had been
made some decades earlier but never acted upon.46 The Bureau of Indian Affairs
had been relying on Public Health Service officers to assist in administering Indian health programs since 1926, and the transfer was intended in part to secure
better resources and more qualified staff.47 The Division of Indian Health was
thus created in the Public Health Service, under the U.S. Surgeon General.48
By 1955, the Indian health appropriation had grown to nearly $18 million,49
a dramatic increase from the $40,000 appropriated in 1911, and the Division of

43. Act of Apr. 16, 1934, ch. 147, § 1, 48 Stat. 596, 596 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C.
§ 5342 (Supp. IV 2016)). The provision of health care services under the Johnson O’Malley Act was
limited by the fact that many Indians still lived in areas where local health services were simply not available. U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., HEALTH SERVICES FOR AMERICAN INDIANS 92 (1957).
44. MERIAM ET AL., supra note 40, at 98.
45. Indian Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, ch. 567, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. (Supp. IV 2016); see Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 39, at 380–84, 395 (describing how the Government’s assimilationist tone towards tribes continued in federal policy, particularly
in health policy, into the 1950s and in turn encouraged the organization of tribal governments).
46. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV., INDIAN HEALTH SERV., INDIAN HEALTH MANUAL,
Part 1-3.1, https://www.ihs.gov/IHM/index.cfm?module=dsp_ihm_pc_p1c3#1-3.1B (last visited July 14,
2018) (indicating that proposals were made as early as 1919); Transfer Act, Pub. L. No. 83-568, § 1, 68
Stat. 674, 674 (1954) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2001 (Supp. IV 2016)) (“All functions, responsibilities, authorities, and duties . . . relating to the maintenance and operation of hospital and health facilities for Indians, and conservation of the health of Indians, are hereby transferred to, and shall be administered by, the Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service, under the supervision and
direction of the Secretary of Health, and Human Services . . . .”).
47. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at § 22.04[1]; Pfefferbaum et al., supra note 39, at 382.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2001(a) (Supp. IV 2016).
49. U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., HEALTH SERVICES FOR AMERICAN INDIANS 88 (1957).
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Indian Health administered a $24.5 million total budget.50 However, the Division
reported to Congress that the funding was still insufficient: “Especially in recent
years, rising medical costs and contraction in the value of the dollar, not to mention increased utilization of services by the Indians, have largely offset increases
in appropriations.”51
The tenor of Indian policy changed markedly in the 1960s. The “Termination” policy of the 1950s was repudiated, and a new era of tribal self-determination took its place.52 By 1976, as Congress considered draft legislation that would
become the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, the Indian Health Service annual budget had grown to $274 million.53 Still, the poor state of Indian health
was appalling, and the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs noted
that Indians and Alaska Natives “suffer a health status far below that of the general population[.]”54 The Committee Report also stated that “any effort to fulfill
Federal responsibilities to the Indian people must begin with the provision of
health services.”55 Congress affirmed that view in enacting the IHCIA for the
first time later that year, finding: “Federal health services to maintain and improve the health of the Indians are consonant with and required by the Federal
Government’s historical and unique legal relationship with, and resulting responsibility to, the American Indian people.”56
C. The Modern Federal Legal Framework for Indian Health Care
Enactment of the IHCIA marked a major turning point in the provision of
federal health care services to Indian people. Though rooted in the same broad
trust responsibility as earlier acts of Congress, the IHCIA was the first federal
legislation to enact specific statutory programs for Indian health care. The comprehensive reform measures included in the IHCIA were designed to address a
slew of problems identified and viewed by Congress as impediments to a better
health status for Indian people as a whole, including: “inadequate, outdated, inefficient, and undermanned facilities”; “shortage of personnel”; “insufficient services in such areas as laboratory, hospital inpatient and outpatient, eye care and
mental health services, and services available through contracts with private phy-

50. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1026, pt. 1, at 14 (1976).
51. U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., HEALTH SERVICES FOR AMERICAN INDIANS 88 (1957).
52. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at § 1.07.
53. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1026, pt. 1, at 14. The “Division of Indian Health” was retitled the “Indian
Health Service” in 1968, and that title remains today. Id.
54. Id. at 15.
55. Id. at 13.
56. Indian Health Care Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 94-437, § 2, 90 Stat. 1400, 1400 (1976) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. IV 2016)).
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sicians, clinics, and agencies”; “related support factors”; “lack of access of Indians to health services due to remote residences, undeveloped or underdeveloped
communication and transportation systems, and difficult, sometimes severe, climate conditions”; and “lack of safe water and sanitary waste disposal services.”57
In order to address the staffing shortage in Indian health facilities, Title I of
the IHCIA created grant and scholarship programs to encourage Indians to enter
the health profession and to recruit health care professionals into the Indian
health care system.58 Title II also authorized additional staffing positions and
funding for direct and indirect patient care, field health, dental care, mental
health, substance abuse, training, maintenance, and more.59 To address “inadequate, outdated, inefficient, and undermanned facilities” within the system, Title
III authorized appropriations for the construction and renovation of hospitals,
health centers, health stations, and staff housing.60 Title III also authorized funding to “supply unmet needs for safe water and sanitary waste disposal facilities
in existing and new Indian homes and communities.”61 In addition, Title V of the
IHCIA authorized the Secretary to enter into contracts with urban Indian organizations to establish programs “to make health services more accessible to the
urban Indian population.”62
The IHCIA also helped Tribes and the IHS to leverage existing federal resources to increase access to health care for Indians. Section 401 of the IHCIA,
for example, added Section 1880 of the Social Security Act to permit IHS hospitals (including those operated by Indian tribes) to collect Medicare reimbursement.63 Importantly, Section 401 specified that any Medicare payments received
under the new Section 1880 “shall not be considered in determining appropriations for health care and services to Indians.”64 Section 402 of the IHCIA similarly added Section 1911 of the Social Security Act, making IHS and tribal health
facilities eligible to collect Medicaid reimbursements,65 and amended Section
1905 of the Social Security Act to apply a 100 per centum Federal medical assistance percentage “with respect to amounts expended as medical assistance for
services which are received through an Indian Health Service facility whether

57.
health).
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. § 2(f), 90 Stat. at 1400–01 (stating multiple factors determined by Congress that imperil Indian
Id. § 103, 90 Stat. at 1403 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1613 (Supp. IV 2016)).
Id. § 201(a), (c), 90 Stat. at 1404–06 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1621 (Supp. IV 2016)).
Id. § 301, 90 Stat. at 1406–07 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1631 (Supp. IV 2016)).
Id. § 302, 90 Stat. at 1406–07 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1632 (Supp. IV 2016)).
Id. § 501, 90 Stat. at 1410 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1651 (Supp. IV 2016)).
Id. § 401, 90 Stat. at 1408–09 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395qq (Supp. IV 2016)).
Id.
Id. § 402(a), 90 Stat. at 1409–10 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396j (Supp. IV 2016)).
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operated by the Indian Health Service or by an Indian tribe or tribal organization[.]”66
Overall, the IHCIA was designed to “authorize a sustained and coordinated
Federal health effort” to “establish a firm foundation upon which a continuous
program capable of meeting the total health needs of the Indian and Alaska Native people could be maintained[.]”67 However, the goal was not only to increase
the “quantity and quality of health services” available to Indians, but also to “encourage the maximum participation of Indians in the planning and management
of those services.”68 In this way, the IHCIA was also a reflection of the burgeoning federal policy of tribal self-determination, the cornerstone of which is the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA), enacted in
1975, just one year prior to the IHCIA.69
The ISDEAA, also known by its Public Law number, 93-638, was intended
to promote Indian self-determination by increasing tribal control over services
provided to tribal members.70 In order to achieve that goal, the ISDEAA allows
tribes to take over federal programs for Indians (including health programs) by
contracting with the federal government to carry them out, “[i]n effect . . .
step[ping] into the shoes of the federal [agencies]” that formerly provided those
programs and services.71 This has the effect of allowing tribes to build the capac-

66. Id. § 402(e), 90 Stat. at 1410 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (Supp. IV 2016)).
67. S. REP. NO. 94-133, at 13–14 (1975). It should be noted, however, that the IHCIA did not appropriate funding, so the implementation of its various provisions is still dependent on annual discretionary
appropriations by Congress.
68. § 2(b), 90 Stat. at 1400 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 1601 (Supp. IV 2016)) (stating that a
major national goal was to “permit the health status of Indians to be raised to the highest possible level”).
69. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203, 2203
(1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5301 et seq. (Supp. IV 2016)).
70. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-1600, at 1, 6–7 (1974) (describing the many purposes of the ISDEAA,
including to promote Indian participation in the government and education, provide for the full participation of Indian tribes in federal government programs and services, and to establish programs whereby
Indian citizens can control education and youth intern programs). The legislative goals of the ISDEAA
are also summarized as follows in the Act’s Congressional declaration of Policy:
The Congress declares its commitment to the maintenance of the Federal Government’s unique and
continuing relationship with, and responsibility to, individual Indian tribes and to the Indian people
as a whole through the establishment of a meaningful Indian self-determination policy which will
permit an orderly transition from federal domination of programs for, and services to, Indians to
effective and meaningful participation by the Indian people in the planning, conduct, and administration of those programs and services. In accordance with this policy, the United States is committed to supporting and assisting Indian tribes in the development of strong and stable tribal governments, capable of administering quality programs and developing the economies of their
respective communities.
25 U.S.C. § 5302(b) (Supp. IV 2016).
71. Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, The History, Status, and Future of Tribal SelfGovernance Under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
1, 21 (2015)
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ity to perform essential governmental functions as well as to improve the programs themselves by making them more responsive to local tribal needs.72 Over
the years the ISDEAA has had a profound impact on the delivery of health care
services to Indian people.
The tribal assumption of federal programs under the ISDEAA began with
self-determination contracting under Title I.73 Though Congress was forced to
enact several amendments to the ISDEAA to address deep-seated agency resistance to handing over its federal authority and associated funding to tribes,74
Title I contracting nevertheless showed immediate promise. Title I gives all federally recognized Indian tribes and eligible tribal organizations the right to contract for funds and responsibilities for programs provided to Indians by either the
Department of the Interior or the Department of Health and Human Services,75
and restricts the agencies’ ability to decline a contract proposal except where
specific statutory criteria justify a declination. With respect to contract funding,
the awarding agency is required to provide “not less than the appropriate Secretary would have otherwise provided for the operation of the programs or portions
thereof for the period covered by the contract” (in other words, the same amount
the agency would have spent to operate the program itself),76 as well as “contract
support costs” to cover administrative and overhead costs that are not included
in the program amount.77
Contracts negotiated under Title I are unique government-to-government
agreements, and while they are considered legally binding to the same extent as
regular contracts,78 they differ significantly in other ways from ordinary government procurement contracts. For one thing, ISDEAA contracts are generally exempt from the Federal Acquisition Regulations and other Federal contracting or

72. Id.
73. See 25 U.S.C. § 5321 (Supp. IV 2016) (authorizing federally recognized tribes or tribal organizations to contract with the IHS to plan, conduct and administer programs, functions, services, or activities, or portions thereof, that the HIS would otherwise provide for Indians because of their status as Indians).
74. See generally Strommer & Osborne, supra note 71, at 18–49 (describing the legislative history
and major amendments of the ISDEAA). The most significant amendments include: Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2285; Tribal
Self-Governance Act of 1994, Pub L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250; and Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711; see also 25 U.S.C. § 5321 (Supp. IV. 2016) (describing
all amendments made to Section 5321 since enactment).
75. 25 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2016).
76. 25 U.S.C. § 5325(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2016).
77. 25 U.S.C. § 5325(a)(2) (Supp. IV 2016).
78. See Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 638–39 (2005) (describing and rejecting
the Government’s argument that Contracts under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act are special contracts that should be treated differently from other government procurement contracts).
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cooperative agreement laws.79 And, while tribes and the agencies have the flexibility to negotiate any provision into a Title I contract that they wish, the Act
requires that certain mandatory provisions be included in all contracts in order to
strike a balance between Congress’s policy of promoting tribal self-determination and maintaining reasonable federal oversight over how contracted responsibilities are carried out.80 Contracting tribes are required to provide an annual audit, but any additional reports must be justified by the agency and negotiated by
the parties.81 Additionally, an agency may unilaterally reassume a contracted
program, but only if there is a violation of the rights or endangerment to the
health, safety, or welfare of any person, or if a contractor mismanages trust funds
or lands, or interests in such lands.82 And, contracting tribes have the right to
reallocate funds awarded in a contract, provided the reallocation does not “have
an adverse effect on the performance of the contract,”83 and to redesign any nonconstruction program, with agency approval, to better meet local conditions and
needs.84
In 1988, Congress expanded the ISDEAA by enacting the Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project under Title III.85 The general intent behind self79. See 25 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(1) (Supp. IV 2016) (stating that Federal contracting or cooperative
agreement laws apply only to the extent that such laws expressly apply to Indian tribes).
80. See Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, §108, 108 Stat.
4250, 4261 (1994) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5329(c) (Supp. IV 2016)) (amending section
108(c) of the ISDEAA to set out a “model agreement” that must be included in or incorporated by reference into every Title I contract).
81. See 25 U.S.C. § 5305(f)(1)-(2) (Supp. IV 2016) (indicating that each tribal organization that receives or uses funds pursuant to a contract must submit a single agency audit report to the Secretary for
each fiscal year the organization is part of that contract).
82. See 25 U.S.C. § 5330 (Supp. IV 2016) (outlining the scenarios in which an agency may assume
control a contracted program, including a determination by the Secretary that the tribal organization’s
contract performance involves a violation of the rights or endangerment to the health, safety, or welfare
of any person, or “gross negligence or mismanagement” in the use of funds, trust funds or lands, or interests in such lands).
83. See 25 U.S.C. § 5325(o) (Supp. IV 2016) (explaining that a tribal organization can rebudget or
reallocate funds awarded in a contract, as long as the reallocation does not adversely impact the performance of the contract).
84. 25 U.S.C. § 5324(j) (Supp. IV 2016). Proposals to redesign a program are subject to the same
limited statutory declination criteria as a new contract proposal. See 25 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(2) (Supp. IV
2016) (requiring the Secretary to approve a proposal and award a contract unless they find “(A) the service
to be rendered to the Indian beneficiaries of the particular program or function to be contracted will not
be satisfactory; (B) adequate protection of trust resources is not assured; (C) the proposed project or function to be contracted for cannot be properly completed or maintained by the proposed contract; (D) the
amount of funds proposed under the contract is in excess of the applicable funding level for the contract,
. . . or (E) the program, function, service, or activity . . . that is the subject of the proposal is beyond the
scope of programs, functions, services, or activities covered under paragraph (1) because the proposal
includes activities that cannot lawfully be carried out by the contractor”).
85. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100472, §§ 301–06, 102 Stat. 2285, 2296–98 repealed by Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-260, § 10, 114 Stat. 711, 734.
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governance is similar to self-determination: to implement Congress’s policy of
allowing tribes to assume control over service delivery of federally funded programs that benefit Indians and Alaska Natives, and enhancing the ability of tribal
governments to govern their communities.86 Self-governance implements this intent slightly differently, however, primarily by placing greater emphasis on minimizing federal agency oversight and maximizing flexibility for tribes to redesign
programs and reallocate resources included in a self-governance agreement.87
“In effect,” self-governance tribes “receive funds in the contractual equivalent of
block grants from the Secretary.”88 Initially, the self-governance demonstration
project applied only to Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) programs within Department of the Interior, but it proved very popular and was soon expanded to the
Department of Health and Human Services, where the IHS resides.89 In 1994,
Congress enacted the Tribal Self-Governance Act, making the program permanent within the Department of the Interior under Title IV,90 and in 2000, Congress made Self-governance a permanent program within the Department of
Health and Human Services under Title V.91
Tribes and tribal organizations around the country have made great strides
in strengthening tribal health care programs and services under the ISDEAA by
leveraging local tribal accountability and expertise and combining tribal and federal resources under an increasing array of federal statutory authority. In 2010,
the IHCIA, which had previously required periodic reauthorization, was
strengthened and permanently re-enacted under Section 10221 of the Affordable
Care Act.92 Among the many new and updated provisions are: revisions to Section 119 to authorize establishment of a national community health aide program
(previously operated only in Alaska) to train and certify community health aides

86. See S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 1, 5 (1987) (discussing the intent behind the federal policy of Indian
self-determination: “to increase the ability of tribal governments to plan and delivery services appropriate
to the needs of tribal members”).
87. See Strommer & Osborne, supra note 71, at 30–31 (“‘Self-governance’ refers both to the broad
principle that tribes have the right to govern themselves, and to particular statutory rights enabling them
to do so through the use of federal program funding.”). Self-governance has three central initiatives,
encompassing (1) broadening the scope of programs and responsibilities tribes can oversee; (2) focusing
on minimizing oversight by federal agencies; and (3) increasing flexibility for tribes to redesign programs
and reallocate resources in their agreements. Id.
88. Id. at 32.
89. Indian Health Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-573, § 814, 106 Stat. 4526, 4590 (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5231 (Supp. IV 2016)) (amending the act to include the Department of Health
and Human Services).
90. Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, § 401, 108 Stat. 4250,
4272 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5361–5368 (Supp. IV 2016)).
91. Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260, §502, 114 Stat. 711, 713–
14 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5382 (Supp. IV 2016)).
92. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10221, 124 Stat. 119, 935–
36 (2010).
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and community health practitioners to provide health care, health promotion, and
disease prevention services in Native communities;93 Section 221, which exempts health care professionals employed by the IHS or a tribal health program
from state licensing requirements in the state in which they are located, provided
they are licensed in any state;94 Section 407, which authorizes the Department of
Veterans Affairs to enter into agreements with tribal health programs to receive
reimbursement for health services to eligible Indian veterans;95 Section 409,
which allows tribes carrying out ISDEAA contracts or compacts to purchase
health insurance coverage for its employees through the Federal Employees
Health Benefits Program;96 and revisions to Title VII to authorize new and expanded services for behavioral health services.97
In addition to permanently re-enacting the IHCIA, the Affordable Care Act
included several Indian-specific provisions, including Section 2901(b), which
provides that the Indian Health Service and tribal health programs are the payors
of last resort;98 Section 2902, which permanently preserves the ability of the IHS
and tribal health programs to bill for all Medicare Part B Services by striking a
5-year sunset provision in prior law;99 and Section 9021, which excludes health
benefits provided by the IHS and tribal health programs to eligible individuals
from taxable gross income.100 The Affordable Care Act also included a number
of special protections for Indians enrolling in a health insurance Marketplace,
such as special monthly enrollment periods, and cost-sharing exemptions.101
These provisions were designed to encourage Indian enrollment and otherwise
expand the financial resources available to IHS and tribal health programs serving Indians. They have allowed tribes to expand and improve health care programs and services in impressive ways and may tribal health programs today
have become key service providers for Indians and non-Indians alike in remote
and rural areas where access to primary and specialty health care is otherwise
lacking.102
93. 25 U.S.C. § 1616l(d) (Supp. IV 2016); see § 10221(a), (b)(1), 124 Stat. at 935–36, for specific
Section 119 textual changes.
94. 25 U.S.C. § 1621t (Supp. IV 2016); see S. Res. 1790, 111th Cong. (2009) (enacted), for text
outlining Section 221 changes.
95. 25 U.S.C. § 1647 (Supp. IV 2016); see S. Res. 1790, for text outlining Section 407 changes.
96. 25 U.S.C. § 1647b (Supp. IV 2016); see S. Res. 1790, for text outlining Section 409 changes.
97. § 10221(a), 124 Stat. at 935 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1665–1665m, § 1667e (Supp.
IV 2016)).
98. § 2901, 124 Stat. at 333 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C § 1623(b) (Supp. IV 2016)).
99. § 2902(a), 124 Stat. at 333 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395qq(e)(1)(A) (Supp. IV
2016)).
100. § 9021, 124 Stat. at 873–74 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 139D (Supp. IV 2016)).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 18031(c)(6)(D) (Supp. IV 2016); 42 U.S.C. § 18071(d) (Supp. IV 2016).
102. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 5006(a)–(e), 123
Stat. 115, 505 (2009) (outlining protections for Native Americans enrolled in state Medicaid programs
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III. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The rise in sophisticated, tribally-operated health care programs and services that benefit both Indians and non-Indians alike has begun to raise questions
about the extent of tribal authority to design and implement those programs and
services free from state interference. As a matter of tribal law, tribes retain inherent sovereignty to self-regulate these matters except to the extent limited by
tribal customary, constitutional, or other law. Federal law, however, purports to
limit inherent tribal sovereignty in many respects and in some cases recognizes
state authority to regulate activity on tribal lands.
As a matter of federal common law, two lines of authority bear on a tribe’s
ability to self-regulate health care services within its own territory. These lines
of authority relate to, first, the application of state laws on tribal lands, and second, tribal jurisdictional authority over individuals and activities—in particular,
non-Indians—on tribal lands. Where no Act of Congress applies to alter the jurisdictional division on tribal lands,103 the framework set out by the Supreme
Court generally precludes the exercise of state authority where that exercise
would “infringe on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and
be ruled by them” or where it is preempted by federal law.104 As to the extent of
tribal authority over non-Indians within reservation boundaries, at the very least
tribes may exercise civil jurisdiction over such individuals where they have entered into “consensual relationships” with the tribe or its members or where the
individual’s conduct “threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe,”105 though tribal
authority may be more extensive on trust as opposed to fee lands.

and in the Children’s Health Insurance Program including, but not limited to, property exemptions, designation of tribal health program as primary care provider, and mandating consultation with Native American health programs on a regular basis).
103. In some locations, jurisdictional statutes alter or add another layer to the analysis. For example,
Public Law 83–280 confers jurisdiction on six “mandatory” states and several “optional states” over criminal and some civil matters on tribal lands within state borders. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (Supp. IV
2016) (granting states jurisdiction over criminal matters occurring on reservation land); 25 U.S.C. §§
1321–1326 (Supp. IV 2016) (granting states jurisdiction in matters involving Indian litigants on reservation land); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (Supp. IV 2016) (granting states jurisdiction over civil causes of action occurring on reservation land). Civil jurisdiction under Public Law 83–280, however, is limited to the state
providing a forum to settle disputes among private parties, Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 388
(1976), and whether a state law is criminal or civil for purposes of Public Law 83–280 depends on whether
the law is considered civil/regulatory or criminal/prohibitory in nature. See California v. Cabazon Band
of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). Thus, state regulatory laws such as licensing of health care
professionals are unlikely to apply on tribal lands as a result of Public Law 83–280, but some related
criminal penalties—such as for practicing without a license—could apply.
104. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959)).
105. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981) (citations omitted) (“A tribe may
regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
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A. Preemption of State Law and Infringement on Tribal Government
Historically, the general rule has been that state laws do not apply on Indian
tribal lands—at least not without an express Act of Congress—as Indian affairs
is a matter of tribal and federal control.106 As a general matter, this rule still applies with respect to the property and activities of Indians in Indian country.107
However, where the actions of non-Indians are involved or state interests are
particularly strong, the landscape is a bit more complicated, and over recent decades the courts have allowed for a greater intrusion of state authority on Indian
reservations.108
In Williams v. Lee, the Court affirmed that the “basic policy” of Worcester
v. Georgia remained the law,109 but re-framed the rule of state authority on tribal
lands as follows: “Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question
has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation
Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”110 The Court held in that
case that to allow the exercise of state court jurisdiction over a civil suit brought
by a non-Indian against Indian patrons of his store, which was located on the
Navajo Indian Reservation and operated under a federal license required of persons conducting trade with Indians on Indian reservations, “would undermine the

relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.”).
106. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832) (holding that the Cherokee Nation was
a “distinct community . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no force[.]”).
107. See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 170–01 (1973) (“State laws generally
are not applicable to tribal Indians on an Indian reservation except where Congress has expressly provided
that State laws shall apply.”) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 144 (1980) (“When on-reservation conduct involving only Indians is at
issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the State’s regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the
federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest.”) (citation omitted)).
108. See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215 (1987) (citing New
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 331–32 (1983) (noting that States may assert authority
over the activities of nonmembers in “certain circumstances,” and may also assert authority over on reservation activities of trial members in “exceptional circumstances.”). The Court pointed to Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976) and Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 138 (1980), as illustrative: in
those cases, the Court permitted the State to require tribal smokeshops on Indian reservations to collect
state sale taxes from non-Indian customers entering the reservation to purchase tobacco products, due to
the State’s strong interest in assuring the collection of sales taxes from non-Indians utilizing state services
and the “minimal burden” imposed on the tribal smokeshop operators.
109. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959) (“Over the years this Court has modified these
principles in cases where essential tribal relations were not involved and where the rights of Indians would
not be jeopardized, but the basic policy of Worcester has remained.”). But see White Mountain Apache
Tribe, 448 U.S. at 141 (1980) (citing Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561) (noting that “Long ago the Court departed
from Mr. Chief Justice Marshall’s view that ‘the laws of [a State] can have no force’ within reservation
boundaries[.]”).
110. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
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authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe
on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.”111
In addition to infringement on the right of tribal self-governance, state authority can also be precluded on tribal lands where it is preempted by federal law.
In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, the Court noted the distinction:
Congress has broad power to regulate tribal affairs under the Indian
Commerce Clause, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. See United States v. Wheeler,
supra, at 322-323, 98 S.Ct., at 1085-1086. This congressional authority and the “semi-independent position” of Indian tribes have given
rise to two independent but related barriers to the assertion of state
regulatory authority over tribal reservations and members. First, the
exercise of such authority may be pre-empted by federal law. See, e.
g., Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685,
85 S.Ct. 1242, 14 L.Ed.2d 165 (1965); McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Comm’n, supra. Second, it may unlawfully infringe “on the right
of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them.”
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220, 79 S.Ct. 269, 271, 3 L.Ed.2d 251
(1959) . . . . The two barriers are independent because either, standing
alone, can be a sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable to
activity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal members.112
The Supreme Court has summarized the preemption test as follows:
State jurisdiction is pre-empted by the operation of federal law if it
interferes with or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are sufficient
to justify the assertion of state authority.113
This preemption doctrine is different from the general federal preemption
of state law analysis that applies outside the context of federal Indian law.114
Specifically, “The tradition of Indian sovereignty over the reservation and tribal
members must inform the determination whether the exercise of state authority
has been pre-empted by operation of federal law[,]” and “traditional notions of
Indian self-government” thus provide “an important backdrop” to the preemption

111. Id. at 223.
112. 448 U.S. at 142–43.
113. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 334–35 (citations omitted).
114. See White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 143 (“The unique historical origins of tribal sovereignty make it generally unhelpful to apply to federal enactments regulating Indian tribes those standards
of pre-emption that have emerged in other areas of the law. Tribal reservations are not States, and the
differences in the form and nature of their sovereignty make it treacherous to import to one notions of preemption that are properly applied to the other.”).
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analysis.115 Due to the pervasive authority of Congress over Indian affairs, Congress need not have expressly spoken on the matter or expressed a specific intent
to preempt state law in a given area.116
Rather, in the context of Indian law, the preemption analysis involves a factspecific balancing of federal, tribal, and state interests.117 Due in part to its factspecific nature, the outcome of the preemption test can be unpredictable. In general, the courts will usually find that state jurisdiction is preempted when the
matter at issue involves the conduct of Indians on the reservation, or the activities
of the tribal government itself.118 The greater the involvement of non-Indians or
non-Indian interests in the activity, however, the greater likelihood that the courts
will find that state regulation is not preempted.119 For example, in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, the Court upheld a severance tax on non-Indian oil
and gas producers located on-reservation, even though the Tribe imposed its own
tax and despite the existence of a federal statute governing oil and gas leases on
Indian lands.120 The Court, emphasizing that the preemption analysis is “flexible,” and “sensitive to the particular state, federal, and tribal interest involved,”121
found “no history of tribal independence from state taxation” of mineral leases
under federal law.122 It also found that the burden on the Tribe was minimal when
weighed against the state’s legitimate interest in the tax arising from its provision
of services to both the Tribe and the mineral lessee, as well as its role in regulating oil and gas drilling on the reservation.123 In contrast, in New Mexico v.
Mescalero Apache Tribe, the Court held that New Mexico could not apply its
115. Id; see also McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (“The Indian
sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then, not because it provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this
suit, but because it provides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be
read.”).
116. See White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 144 (“We have thus rejected the proposition that
in order to find a particular state law to have been preempted by operation of federal law, an express
congressional statement to that effect is required.”); see also Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold
Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877, 885 (1986) (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 334).
117. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176 (1989) (“Each case ‘requires a particularized examination of the relevant state, federal, and tribal interests.’”) (quoting Ramah Navajo Sch.
Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of N.M., 458 U.S. 832, 838 (1982)).
118. See supra note 107.
119. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 160–61 (1980)
(upholding the requirement that the Tribe collect and remit State taxes on cigarette sales to non-Indians);
see also Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 483
(1976) (“We therefore agree with the District Court that to the extent that the ‘smoke shops’ sell to those
upon whom the State has validly imposed a sales or excise tax with respect to the article sold, the State
may require the Indian proprietor simply to add the tax to the sales price and thereby aid the State’s collection and enforcement thereof.”).
120. 490 U.S. at 186.
121. Id. at 184.
122. Id. at 182.
123. Id. at 185–86.
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fishing and hunting laws to non-members on the tribe’s reservation because the
state hunting and fishing laws at issue were incompatible with “the comprehensive scheme of federal and tribal management established pursuant to federal
law[,]”124 and because the state could not identify any regulatory function or service it provided or off-reservation effects that would justify the assertion of its
authority over hunting and fishing on the Tribe’s reservation.125
In an outlier case, Rice v. Rehner, the Supreme Court held that state liquor
licensing laws could be applied to an individually-owned retail establishment
operated by a tribal member on the reservation, in part because (in the Court’s
view) there was no tradition of tribal sovereign immunity or inherent self-government in favor of liquor regulation by Indians.126 Regulation of liquor sales
presents a unique case: such regulation has been pervasive in Indian country
since colonial times, so tribal sovereignty with respect to liquor has long been
impaired—as the Court noted, “in addition to the congressional divestment of
tribal self-government in this area, the States have also been permitted, and even
required, to impose regulations related to liquor transactions.”127 The Rice decision departed from the Supreme Court’s ordinary infringement and preemption
analysis in its narrow interpretation of the “backdrop” of tribal sovereignty, focusing on the tribe’s traditional lack of control over liquor regulation rather than
its tradition of self-government in general.128
In a later case commonly cited for its preemption analysis, California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, the Supreme Court took a less restrictive approach and held that the application of California gaming laws to the tribe’s high
stakes bingo operation on tribal lands was precluded.129 In Cabazon, noting that
the case involved “a state burden on tribal Indians in the context of their dealings
with non-Indians” coming from off-reservation, the Court described the preemption test as follows:
Decision in this case turns on whether state authority is pre-empted
by the operation of federal law; and “[s]tate jurisdiction is pre-empted
. . . if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests
reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are sufficient
to justify the assertion of state authority.” Mescalero, 462 U.S., at 333,
334, 103 S.Ct., at 2385, 2386. The inquiry is to proceed in light of
traditional notions of Indian sovereignty and the congressional goal of

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

462 U.S. 324, 338, 343–44 (1983).
Id. at 341–42.
463 U.S. 713, 725 (1983).
Id. at 723.
Id. at 738–40.
480 U.S. 202, 221–22 (1987).
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Indian self-government, including its “overriding goal” of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development. Id., at 334-335,
103 S.Ct., at 2386-2387.130
In applying that test, the Court noted that in addition to the “important federal interests” of tribal self-sufficiency and economic development, the federal
government actively approved of and promoted tribal bingo enterprises in specific ways: for example, the Secretary of the Interior had made grants and guaranteed loans for constructing bingo facilities, and approved the tribal ordinances
establishing and regulating the very gaming activities that the state sought to
regulate.131 The tribes’ interests, the Court further noted, were “obviously parallel” to the federal interests, in that the bingo enterprises provided the sole source
of revenue for tribal government and services, and were a major source of employment on the tribes’ reservations.132 Nor were the tribes “merely marketing
an exemption from state gambling laws,” as the Court had found in some cases
involving state taxation on the sale of tobacco products on tribal lands:133
Here, however, the Tribes are not merely importing a product onto
the reservations for immediate resale to non-Indians. They have built
modern facilities which provide recreational opportunities and ancillary services to their patrons, who do not simply drive onto the reservations, make purchases and depart, but spend extended periods of
time there enjoying the services the Tribes provide. The Tribes have a
strong incentive to provide comfortable, clean, and attractive facilities
and well-run games in order to increase attendance at the games. The
tribal bingo enterprises are similar to the resort complex, featuring
hunting and fishing, that the Mescalero Apache Tribe operates on its
reservation through the “concerted and sustained” management of reservation land and wildlife resources. 134
130. Id. at 216.
131. Id. at 217–18 (“Under the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. (1982 ed. and
Supp. III), the Secretary of the Interior has made grants and has guaranteed loans for the purpose of constructing bingo facilities. See S. Rep. No. 99-493, p. 5 (1986); Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. McGuigan,
626 F. Supp. 245, 246 (Conn. 1986). The Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Health and Human Services have also provided financial assistance to develop tribal gaming
enterprises. See S. Rep. No. 99-493, supra, at 4. Here, the Secretary of the Interior has approved tribal
ordinances establishing and regulating the gaming activities involved. See H. R. Rep. No. 99-488, p. 10
(1986). The Secretary has also exercised his authority to review tribal bingo management contracts under
25 U.S.C. § 81, and has issued detailed guidelines governing that review.”).
132. Id. at 218–19.
133. Id. at 219; see also Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134, 155–57 (1980) (upholding state cigarette sales tax deemed to fall on the non-Indian purchasers
of cigarettes on tribal lands, finding that the value marketed to those purchasers was not generated on the
reservation and citing the State’s strong interest in assuring the collection of sales taxes from non-Indians
utilizing state services).
134. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. Id. at 219–20 (New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache
Tribe, 462 U.S., at 341, 103 S.Ct., at 2390).
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The Court thus concluded, “the Cabazon and Morongo Bands are generating value on the reservations through activities in which they have a substantial
interest.”135 In contrast, the Court determined that the state’s asserted interest in
preventing the infiltration of tribal bingo by organized crime was weak because
the state permitted the play of charity bingo games within the state.136 As a result,
the Court held, state regulation was preempted.137
B. Tribal Authority over Non-Indians on Tribal Lands
Apart from the preemption of state law, to realistically and successfully
self-regulate the provision of health care services on tribal lands, tribes need to
exercise civil regulatory and perhaps adjudicatory power over non-Indians. The
question here is the extent to which federal law continues to recognize a tribe’s
inherent authority to do so.
Montana v. United States is considered a critically important precedential
decision on the scope of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians.138 Montana
involved the question of whether the Crow Tribe could regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers on non-Indian fee land within the boundaries of the Crow
Indian Reservation.139 Reversing the Court of Appeals, which held that such regulatory power was an incident of the Tribe’s inherent sovereignty over its reservation, the Supreme Court instead held that: “As a general proposition, the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of
nonmembers of the tribe.”140 The Court continued, however, stating:
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise
some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through
commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe
may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.141
Thus, Montana establishes that one of these two exceptions must be met
before a tribe may regulate the activities of non-members on non-Indian fee lands

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 220.
Id. at 221 n. 25.
Id. at 221–22.
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
Id. at 557.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 565–66 (internal citations omitted).
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within reservation boundaries. In that case, the Court found that neither exception applied, and that the Crow Tribe therefore could not impose its hunting and
fishing regulations on non-Indians on the fee lands at issue.142
In a later case, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation, the Court applied its Montana analysis to hold that tribal zoning
and land use laws did not apply to non-Indian fee land within the tribe’s reservation.143 The Court interpreted Montana’s second exception quite narrowly to allow tribal regulation only when the impact of the non-Indian conduct is “demonstrably serious” and “imperils” the political integrity, the economic security, or
the health or welfare of the tribe.144 The Supreme Court has further emphasized
the narrow nature of the Montana exceptions in subsequent cases. In Strate v.
A-1 Contractors, for example, the Court held that a car accident on a state highway running through the Tribe’s reservation did not fall within either exception
for purposes of establishing tribal court jurisdiction over tort claims brought by
a non-Indian reservation resident injured in the accident, even though the defendant (A-1 Contractors) was engaged in contract work for the Tribe on the reservation.145 With respect to the first exception, the Court held that although A-1 Contractors had a “consensual relationship” with the Tribe, the plaintiff was not a
party to the contract and the Tribe was not involved in the accident, so the relationship was not of the “qualifying kind” to establish jurisdiction.146 As for the
second exception, the Court stated: “Undoubtedly, those who drive carelessly on
a public highway running through a reservation endanger all in the vicinity, and
surely jeopardize the safety of tribal members. But if Montana’s second exception requires no more, the exception would severely shrink the rule.”147
While the Court in Strate was faced with the scope of the Tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction (specifically, the ability of the tribal court to hear tort claims
brought against a non-Indian defendant), the Court nevertheless employed the
Montana analysis. The Strate majority explained:
While Montana immediately involved regulatory authority, the
Court broadly addressed the concept of “inherent sovereignty.” Regarding activity on non-Indian fee land within a reservation, Montana
delineated—in a main rule and exceptions—the bounds of the power

142. Id. at 564–67.
143. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indians, 492 U.S. 408, 422 (1989).
144. Id. at 431.
145. 520 U.S. 438, 454 (1997).
146. Id. at 457.
147. Id. at 457–58; see Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 655 (2001) (“The consensual
relationship must stem from ‘commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements,’ Montana, 450
U.S. at 565, and a nonmember’s actual or potential receipt of tribal police, fire, and medical services does
not create the requisite connection. If it did, the exception would swallow the rule[.]”); see also Plains
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 330 (2008).
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tribes retain to exercise “forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians.”
As to nonmembers, we hold, a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does
not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.148
The Court further held that the right-of-way held by the state rendered the
state highway on which the underlying accident occurred “equivalent, for nonmember governance purposes, to alienated, non-Indian land[,]” even though the
accident occurred within the borders of the reservation.149
Montana, Brendale, and Strate thus all addressed tribal jurisdictional authority over non-Indians on fee land or its “equivalent” within reservation boundaries.150 The extent to which the same analysis—with its broad general rule
against tribal authority and two narrow exceptions—applies to tribal trust land is
still not completely clear. Less than one year after Montana, the Court in Merrion
v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe upheld the Tribe’s ability to tax non-Indian oil and gas
producers on tribal lands as an exercise of “the tribe’s general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity within its jurisdiction” and “a necessary instrument of self-government and territorial management.”151 Alternatively, the
Court reasoned, the Tribe had authority to impose the tax by virtue of its power
to exclude non-members—a power that “necessarily includes the lesser power to
place conditions on entry, on continued presence, or on reservation conduct, such
as a tax on business activities conducted on the reservation.”152 The Court in
Merrion reached these conclusions without ever suggesting that Montana might
pose any bar to the Tribe’s exercise of such authority or that the Tribe was required to meet one of the two Montana exceptions in order to do so.153 Indeed,
in Montana itself the Court expressly “agreed” with the Court of Appeals that,
“on land belonging to the Tribe or held by the United States in trust for the
Tribe,” a tribe may regulate activities of nonmembers.154
However, in Nevada v. Hicks, the Supreme Court held that a tribal court
lacked jurisdiction over civil claims against state officials who had entered trib-

148. Strate, 520 U.S. at 453 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563–65 (1981)).
149. Id. at 454.
150. See id. at 456–58; Montana, 450 U.S. at 564–65; Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of
the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 431 (1989).
151. 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982).
152. Id. at 144.
153. See generally Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
154. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1980). Likewise, the second exception itself refers
to “civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within [the tribe’s] reservation[.]” Id. at
566. Subsequent decisions of this Court have also seemed to confirm this understanding of the scope of
the Montana rule and its exceptions. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 453 (describing Montana and its exceptions
as “[r]egarding activity on non-Indian fee land”); see also Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S.
645, 654 (2001) (referring to “Montana’s general rule that Indian tribes lack civil authority over nonmembers on non-Indian fee land”).
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ally-owned land to execute a warrant against a tribal member for an off-reservation violation of state law.155 In so holding, the Court stated that Indian land
ownership does not suspend “the ‘general proposition’ … that ‘the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers
of the tribe’ except to the extent ‘necessary to protect tribal self-government or
to control internal relations.’”156 The Court explained: “The ownership status of
the land, in other words, is only one factor to consider in determining whether
regulation of the activities of nonmembers is ‘necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or to control internal relations.’”157
Hicks itself arguably addressed only a narrow question arising from an extreme set of facts—i.e. a tribe’s ability to regulate state law enforcement’s execution of a search warrant relating to off-reservation violations of state law.158
Under the unique facts of that case, the Court held that tribal court jurisdiction
was precluded because “the principle that Indians have the right to make their
own laws and be governed by them requires an accommodation between the interests of the Tribes and the Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of
the State, on the other.”159 At the same time, the Court recognized that in the
ordinary case the status of the land in question is “significant” or even “dispositive” to the underlying question of whether the exercise of tribal authority is
“necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.”160
Hicks, therefore, did not fully answer the question of the applicability of the
Montana rule and its narrow exceptions to tribal authority over non-members on
tribal lands. The Court in Hicks also employed the Montana analysis while noting that it remains an “open question” whether tribal court jurisdiction over nonIndian defendants in general is as broad as the Tribe’s regulatory jurisdiction, or

155. 533 U.S. 353, 366–68 (2001).
156. Id. at 358–60 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 564–65) (noting, in addition, that it was “impl[ied]
that the general rule of Montana applies to both Indian and non-Indian land.”).
157. Id. at 360.
158. Id. at 358 n. 2 (“Our holding in this case is limited to the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over
state officers enforcing state law.”).
159. Id. at 362 (quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 477 U.S. 134,
156 (1980)). The Court accordingly held that “tribal authority to regulate state officers in executing process related to the violation, off reservation, of state laws is not essential to tribal self-government or
internal relations[.]” Id. at 364.
160. Id. at 370–71 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 564–65). In response to criticism by Justice O’Connor
in her concurring opinion that the Court did not sufficiently consider the status of the land at issue, the
Hicks majority further stated: “To the contrary, we acknowledge that tribal ownership is a factor in the
Montana analysis, and a factor significant enough that it ‘may sometimes be . . . dispositive[.]’ . . . We
simply do not find it dispositive in the present case, when weighed against the State’s interest in pursuing
off-reservation violations of its laws.” Id. at 370 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 360).

2018]

TRIBAL SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY

141

whether there are additional limitations on that adjudicatory jurisdiction.161 After
granting a writ of certiorari in a recent case that could potentially have resolved
those questions, an equally divided Court affirmed the Court of Appeals with no
explanation.162 A fair reading of the Court’s precedent as a whole, however, and
the most consistent with the history of federal Indian law and policy dating back
to Worcester v. Georgia, is that tribes retain broader latitude to regulate and adjudicate the conduct of nonmembers on tribal lands than on non-Indian fee lands,
because a Tribe’s interests in self-government and territorial management are
strongest on its own lands and because the Tribe also retains its inherent authority
to exclude nonmembers from its lands altogether.163 Nevertheless, the safest way
for Tribes to ensure that tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians will be upheld under
federal law is by obtaining explicit consent to jurisdiction under Montana’s first
exception where possible.
IV. PRACTICAL ISSUES RELATED TO TRIBAL SELF-REGULATION OF HEALTH
CARE DELIVERY
On the basis of inherent tribal authority, federal common law, and the federal statutory framework provided by the ISDEAA, the IHCIA, and other federal
laws, tribes and tribal health programs across the country have begun to move
beyond just the operation of federal Indian health programs to the development
and implementation of robust, tribally driven programs that address local needs
in new and innovative ways. These programs are still supported by and consistent
with federal law and policy goals, and often rely to a significant degree on federal
funding. However, as tribes themselves begin to play a larger role in the design
161. Id. at 357–58, 358 n. 2. The Court determined it did “not have to answer that open question”
since it determined that the Tribe lacked regulatory jurisdiction over the State officials in any event. Id.
at 358.
162. See Dollar Gen. Corp. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016), aff’g by an
equally divided court, Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians, 746 F.3d 167, 169 (5th Cir.
2014) (upholding tribal court jurisdiction, on the basis of Montana’s consensual relations exception, over
non-Indian corporation that operated a store on the Tribe’s reservation).
163. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 557 (distinguishing land owned by or held in trust for the Tribe from
fee land owned by nonmembers and agreeing that the Tribe may prohibit or regulate hunting and fishing
on such tribal lands); see also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982) (upholding a
Tribe’s power to tax nonmember activity on tribal lands and observing that a Tribe’s interests in levying
taxes is strongest when the taxed activity takes place on tribal lands). Under this theory, Tribes must meet
one of Montana’s two exceptions on non-Indian fee land because, under such circumstances, those exceptions exclusively define the scope of tribal authority “necessary to protect tribal self-government or control
internal relations.” See, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 651 (2001) (“Although
we extracted from our precedents the general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian
tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe . . . we nonetheless noted in Montana two
possible bases for tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian fee land.”) (internal quotations marks and citations
omitted)). However, on tribal trust lands, the exceptions may be more flexibly applied or may not be the
only means of establishing tribal authority that is “necessary to protect tribal self-government or control
internal relations.” Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
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and implementation of Indian health care services, and as tribal health programs
begin to serve a broader base of individuals on tribal lands, tribal self-regulation
in the health care field becomes increasingly significant. This is especially true
where existing federal programs are insufficient and where state regulation
works at cross-purposes with tribal and local community needs. While the existing legal framework recognizes and allows for such tribal self-regulation of
health care, in some areas that framework could be improved to further encourage and foster innovation in tribal health care consistent with the federal trust
responsibility.
To begin with, the potential regulatory matters that arise in the design and
implementation of tribal health care programs and services are many. They could
include, for example, the application of state and/or tribal licensing requirements
to, and the ongoing regulation of, health care professionals, facilities, and services, as well as enforcement jurisdiction, including for private claims such as
medical torts. These regulatory matters raise jurisdictional questions that, for the
most part, currently must be resolved under the Supreme Court’s preemption/infringement analysis, outlined above. Beyond such jurisdictional questions, tribes
must also consider the availability of federal resources to support tribal programs. Specifically, existing provisions of federal health care law that serve to
implement the federal trust responsibility by funneling federal resources into the
Indian health system were largely designed with the assumption that tribes would
implement existing federal programs, with perhaps some modifications. There
has been movement toward increased tribal flexibility in recent decades, however, including for example greater freedom for tribes to serve non-beneficiaries
without losing benefits and protections available under their ISDEAA contract.
These recent updates to the legal framework have allowed for significant advancements in the tribal health care system and provide a roadmap for future
improvement through increased support for tribal self-regulation.
A. Regulatory and Preemption Issues: Licensing, Regulatory, and Enforcement
Authority
As a matter of federal law under the IHCIA, licensed health professionals
employed by a tribal health program are exempt from the licensing requirements
of the state in which the tribal health program is located, provided they are licensed in any other state.164 When a tribe or tribal organization provides services

164. 25 U.S.C. § 1621t (Supp. IV 2016) (“Licensed health professionals employed by a tribal health
program shall be exempt, if licensed in any State, from the licensing requirements of the State in which
the tribal health program performs the services described in the contract or compact of the tribal health
program under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act.”). In addition, for purposes
of participation as a provider of health care services under a Federal health care program (such as Medi-
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pursuant to an ISDEAA contract or compact,165 these federal licensing rules
preempt state licensing requirements. Where a tribe operates a health care program or provides health care services outside of an ISDEAA contract, however,
or where the tribe regulates but does not itself operate the program or service,
the application of state licensure laws would be subject to the preemption/infringement analysis discussed in Section III.A above.166
Where a tribe has adopted a comprehensive regulatory framework for licensure and regulation of health care professionals, there is a good argument
against state interference under the preemption/infringement analysis. As in New
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, where the Supreme Court held that the state
could not apply its hunting and fishing laws to non-Indians on the reservation
because the Tribe had its own comprehensive program of fish and game management,167 application of state licensure requirements are likely to be inconsistent with tribal requirements and would interfere with tribal self-government
in the field. Further, even though the federal government generally does not regulate licensure of health care professionals or license health care facilities, but
rather leaves such regulation to the states, federal interests nevertheless strongly
support the development of robust tribal health programs according to tribal priorities and without state interference. This interest is clearly reflected in the
ISDEAA and the IHCIA, special Medicare and Medicaid and other federal health
care program provisions for American Indians and Alaska Natives, and regulations across the federal government—from the IHS to the Internal Revenue Service to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services—implementing federal
statutory law, the federal trust responsibility to improve the health status of Indian people, and tribal self-determination policy.168 In this sense, the argument
for preemption of state licensing and regulation of health care professionals
tracks the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Cabazon in holding that state gaming
regulation was preempted on tribal lands: the “important federal interests” and
express federal support for tribal health care programs; parallel federal and tribal
interests; and the value generated by the development of tribal health programs
all weigh in favor of tribal self-regulation.

care, Medicaid, and CHIP), entities operated by the Indian Health Service, an Indian tribe or tribal organization, or an urban Indian organization are deemed to have met state licensing requirements if they meet
all the applicable standards for such licensure, regardless of whether they actually obtain the license. 25
U.S.C. § 1647a (Supp. IV 2016).
165. Section 1621t applies to “tribal health programs,” defined under the IHCIA as “an Indian tribe or
tribal organization that operates any health program, service, function, activity, or facility funded, in whole
or in part, by the [Indian Health] Service through, or provided in, a contract or compact with the Service
under the [ISDEAA].” 25 U.S.C. § 1603(25) (Supp. IV 2016).
166. See discussion supra Section III.A.
167. 462 U.S. 324, 337–38 (1983).
168. See discussion supra Section II.C.
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To enforce its licensure and regulatory scheme against non-Indian practitioners, however, a tribe would have to establish jurisdiction over those individuals under the Montana/Merrion/Hicks line of cases, as discussed above. Due to
the narrow way in which the Supreme Court has framed the Montana exceptions,
and to the extent those exceptions apply with the same force on tribal lands, the
courts may not be willing to apply the second “health or welfare of the Tribe”
exception to establish tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians involved in health care
on tribal lands, even though there is clearly a rational argument that the regulation of health care programs and services in fact goes to the very heart of the
“health and welfare” of the tribe. Regardless, there are various ways that tribes
may seek to affirm jurisdiction to license and regulate non-Indian health care
professionals under the second “consensual relationship” exception, including
through written acknowledgement of tribal jurisdiction as a prerequisite to employment in a tribal health program or entry onto tribal lands for purposes of
providing health care services, or on the basis of the Tribe’s right to self-govern
and exclude individuals from tribal lands under Merrion.169
A similar analysis, for both preemption of state law and tribal regulatory
jurisdiction, would apply to the regulation of health care facilities and practices
(such as the use of traditional, alternative, or complimentary medicine), and to
tribal court jurisdiction over medical torts such as malpractice claims arising on
tribal lands. These questions involve not only health care practitioners, who may
enter into specific employment, licensing, or other types of agreements with the
tribe in order to provide health care services on tribal lands, but also patients
(both Indian and non-Indian) and other individuals present on tribal lands coming
into contact with health care providers and program administrators. With respect
to the preemption/infringement analysis, the determination in each case is factspecific and would depend to some extent on the type of tribal regulatory scheme
at issue, specific federal laws and regulations that may be relevant, and the state
interest at issue. The federal government’s trust responsibility to provide for Indian health care, its policy in support of tribal self-determination, and the comprehensive federal scheme reflected in the ISDEAA and the IHCIA, among other

169. JANE M. SMITH, TRIBAL JURISDICTION OVER NONMEMBERS: A LEGAL OVERVIEW 7–8, 10 (Cong.
Research Serv. 2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43324.pdf. While the regulation of health care professionals by tribes in the manner contemplated here is relatively new, there are many parallels in tribal
regulation of legal professionals practicing in tribal courts—something that is quite common. Many tribes
require membership in a tribal court bar and may impose various requirements on admission, including in
some cases separate bar exams. See, e.g., State Bar of Arizona Ethics Opinion 99-13, STATE BAR OF ARIZ.
(1999), http://www.azbar.org/Ethics/EthicsOpinions/
ViewEthicsOpinion?id=507 (last visited July 20, 2018) (explaining that attorneys’ supervision of nonlawyer paralegals’ representation of clients in tribal court is not in violation of Arizona lawyer’s duty not
to assist in the unauthorized practice of law, where paralegal was a licensed tribal court advocate, because
tribal court’s rules govern the conduct and it is not “unauthorized” under those rules).
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federal laws, should all play a role in this analysis. With respect to tribal jurisdiction, to the extent a tribe can secure specific agreement to tribal civil jurisdiction, such as through a land or building lease or patient consent forms, the jurisdictional analysis is simplified. In the absence of written agreement, tribes should
be able to advance the argument that their interests in self-government and territorial management under Merrion, or one of the Montana exceptions, justifies
tribal jurisdiction over individuals entering onto tribal lands for purposes of
providing or obtaining health care services, particularly on tribal trust (as opposed to fee) lands.
B. Federal Benefits and Protections for Tribal Health Programs
Apart from such jurisdictional questions, another important consideration
for tribes is the extent to which they may self-regulate health care services and
implement innovative new health care programs on tribal lands while still maintaining the many special federal benefits and protections available to tribes and
tribal organizations implementing federal programs under the ISDEAA.170 These
benefits and protections serve to maintain the federal government’s trust responsibility to provide for health care to Indian people even as tribes themselves exercise more control over the design and implementation of specific programs and
services. They also serve to assist tribes in addressing the chronic resource shortage that still exists throughout Indian Country today as a direct result of historical
federal policies dispossessing tribes of resources as well as control over those
resources that remained in tribal possession.
One important benefit extended to tribal contractors under the ISDEAA is
coverage under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).171 In the FTCA, the United
States waived its immunity and consented to be sued for money damages for
injury or loss of property caused by the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions
of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment.172 So long as
they are performing services under an ISDEAA contract or compact, the FTCA
also covers a tribe’s permanent or temporary employees, volunteers, and federal
employees assigned to the contract to work for the tribe.173 Coverage extends to
individuals providing health services to the tribal contractor under personal services contracts in facilities operated under ISDEAA contracts or compacts,174
170. See, e.g., Starla K. Roels & Liz Malerba, New Opportunities for Innovative Healthcare Partnerships with Indian Tribes and Tribal Organizations, HEALTH LAWYER, Oct. 2015, at 25–26, 29.
171. 25 U.S.C. § 5321(d) (Supp. IV 2016); 25 U.S.C. §5396(a) (Supp. IV 2016); 25 C.F.R.§ 900.180
(2018); 42 C.F.R. § 137.220 (2017).
172. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2016). Pursuant to the FTCA, as amended by the Federal
Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, an action against the United States is the exclusive judicial remedy for such claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (Supp. IV 2016).
173. 25 C.F.R. § 900.192 (2018); 25 C.F.R. § 900.206 (2018).
174. 25 C.F.R. § 900.193 (2018).
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and also to tribal employees paid from tribal funds other than those provided
through the contract or compact, as long as the services or activities from which
the claim arose were performed in carrying out the contract or compact.175 For
covered categories of claims, an FTCA claim against the United States is the
exclusive remedy, meaning that any employee or personal services contractor for
the tribe, acting within the scope of his or her employment in carrying out an
ISDEAA contract, will be shielded from liability by the FTCA.176 FTCA coverage was extended to tribes under the ISDEAA because Congress recognized that
the diversion of program funds to purchase liability insurance led to a decrease
in funding for direct services, putting contracting tribes at a disadvantage and
contravening the federal trust responsibility.177
Other provisions applicable to tribal health care programs operated under
the ISDEAA are specifically intended to supplement inadequate IHS funding by
leveraging or providing access to other federal or private insurance funding. For
example, tribal health programs operating under the ISDEAA are specifically
authorized to seek reimbursements for services from Medicare, Medicaid, the
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), as well other third-party payors,
such as private health insurance companies.178 Under the authority of the Public
Health Service Act, the IHCIA and other federal law and policy, tribal health
programs billing for Medicare and Medicaid may collect at what is known as the
175. 25 C.F.R. § 900.197 (2018).
176. 25 C.F.R. § 900.190 (2018); 25 C.F.R. § 900.204 (2018). FTCA coverage does not extend to:
(1) claims against most subcontractors; (2) claims for injuries covered by workmen’s compensation; (3)
breach of contract (as opposed to tort) claims; or (4) claims resulting from activities performed by an
employee that are outside the scope of employment. 25 C.F.R. § 900.183 (2018).
177. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-00-169, FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT:
ISSUES AFFECTING COVERAGE FOR TRIBAL SELF-DETERMINATION CONTRACTS 6 (2000),
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/rc00169.pdf.
178. Historically, the ability to collect Medicare and Medicaid depended in large part on provider type,
facility type, and the program at issue, and before 1976, tribally operated health programs could not collect
reimbursements from Medicare or Medicaid. After 1976, provisions under the Social Security Act and
the IHCIA, as amended over several years, generally authorized certain “facilities of the IHS,” whether
operated by the IHS or by a tribe or tribal organization, to collect Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395qq, 1396j (Supp. IV 2016); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1641, 1642 (Supp. IV 2016). See
also INDIAN HEALTH SERV. & HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN., MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE AND THE HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION (1996),
https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/American-Indian-Alaska-Native/AIAN/LTSS-TACenter/pdf/memorandum-of-agreement.pdf. [hereinafter 1996 MOA]. The Health Care Financing Administration is now called the “Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.” H. REP. NO. 108-391, at
312–315 (2003). When the IHCIA was reauthorized in 2010, the new Section 401 of the Act significantly
revised the old language regarding authority to collect such payments: Section 401(d) authorizes tribal
health programs to elect to “directly bill for, and receive payment for, health care items and services provided by such programs for which payment is made under [Medicare, Medicaid and CHIP] . . . or from
any other third party payor.” 25 U.S.C. § 1641 (Supp. IV 2016); see Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10221(a), 124 Stat. 119, 935–36 (2010), for specific Section 401 textual
changes.
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IHS “encounter rate” (also called the “OMB rate”), which the Department of
Health and Human Services publishes in the Federal Register each year, for certain inpatient and outpatient medical services.179 Additionally, section 1905(b)
of the Social Security Act provides that the Federal medical assistance percentage (in other words, the cost share paid by the federal government for Medicaid
services) “shall be 100 per centum with respect to amounts expended as medical
assistance for services which are received through an Indian Health Service facility whether operated by the Indian Health Service or by an Indian tribe or tribal
organization[.]”180 While not a direct benefit to tribal health providers per se, the
federal government’s promise to reimburse state Medicaid programs for 100%
of services provided to IHS beneficiaries through the IHS or a tribal health facility provides an important incentive for states to work with Tribes to maximize
the availability of Medicaid services to IHS beneficiaries served by tribal health
programs.181
Another example is access to pharmaceuticals for eligible Indian beneficiaries at a discount from the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS). Section 105(k) of
the ISDEAA authorizes Indian tribes and tribal organizations to utilize the FSS
for purposes of carrying out ISDEAA contracts and compacts and deems the
tribes and tribal organizations to be part of the IHS and their employees to be
federal employees for this purpose.182 Section 105(k) specifically includes acquisitions from prime vendors:
179. 82 Fed. Reg. 5585, 5855 (Jan. 18, 2017). Under Section 1905(l)(2)(B) of the Social Security Act,
outpatient health programs or facilities operated by a Tribe or Tribal organization under the ISDEAA are
by definition Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs) and thus may instead elect to bill Medicaid as
FQHCs if they prefer. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(l)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 2016); see also 1996 MOA, supra note 178,
at 1–3 (affirming that tribal facilities could choose to be designated as an IHS provider, allowing them to
collect at the IHS encounter rate for payment of Medicaid services provided to eligible Indian beneficiaries
on or after July 11, 1996).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b) (Supp. IV 2016); see Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-148, § 1905(b), 124 Stat. 119, 284 (2010), for relevant amendments pertaining to section 1905(b).
181. Letter from Vikki Wachino, Director, Department of Health and Human Services, Center for
Medicare & Medicaid Services, to State Health Officials, SHO #16-002 (Feb. 26, 2016),
https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/sho022616.pdf. A recent change to the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Service’s interpretation of section 1905(b) increases that incentive. Id.
Previously, CMS interpreted section 1905(b) to exclude services rendered by outside providers through
the Purchased/Referred Care (PRC) program administered by the IHS and tribes. Id. In a February 26,
2016 letter to State Health Officials, however, CMS announced that it would update its interpretation of
section 1905(b) to extend 100% FMAP to services rendered by a non-IHS or non-tribal provider so long
as that care is provided pursuant to a care coordination agreement meeting certain requirements. Id. It is
up to the IHS or tribal health program to enter into these care coordination agreements, which render the
State eligible for 100% FMAP for Medicaid services provided thereunder. Id.
182. 25 U.S.C. § 5324(k) (Supp. IV 2016); Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-413, § 102, 108 Stat. 4250, 4255. Section 105(k) is specifically made applicable to Title V
compacts and funding agreements by § 516(a) of Title V. Tribal Self–Governance Amendments of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-260, § 516(a), 114 Stat. 711, 729 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5396(a) (Supp. IV
2016)).
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For purposes of carrying out such contract, grant or agreement [under
the ISDEAA], the Secretary shall, at the request of an Indian tribe,
enter into an agreement for the acquisition, on behalf of the Indian
tribe, of any goods, services, or supplies available to the Secretary
from the General Services Administration or other Federal agencies
that are not directly available to the Indian tribe under this section or
under any other Federal law, including acquisitions from prime vendors. All such acquisitions shall be undertaken through the most efficient and speedy means practicable, including electronic ordering arrangements.183
This includes the VA prime vendor program, which makes certain listed federal
agencies (including the IHS) eligible to purchase drugs from the FSS at discounts
determined under agreements between the manufacturers and the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs.184
Questions over the scope of these provisions may arise when tribes choose
to design and implement a tribal health care program outside the scope of an
ISDEAA contract—perhaps in order to address a local health care need that is
not adequately addressed by any existing federal program. In some cases, federal
law has evolved to support tribal innovation by affording tribes greater flexibility
than the IHS in the implementation of federal programs under the ISDEAA, at
least to some degree—thereby avoiding those questions. This is the case, for example, with respect to who may be considered eligible for health care programs
and services. The IHS’s federal regulations define who is eligible for health care
services directly from the IHS and for services the IHS must purchase from nonIHS providers (called “Purchased/Referred Care” or “PRC,” and formerly known
as “contract health services”).185 The general rule is that the IHS will provide
direct services at IHS facilities to persons of Indian descent belonging to the Indian community served by the local facilities and program.186 In its direct-operated facilities, the IHS itself follows an “Open Door Policy” under which the
facility will serve any eligible Indian beneficiary presenting for available services regardless of where that person resides. Eligibility for PRC from the IHS
is directly tied to being eligible for direct care services under the IHS regulations,

183. § 7, 114 Stat. at 732 (codified as amended at § 25 U.S.C. 5324(k) (Supp. IV 2016) (alteration in
original) (emphasis added).
184. 38 U.S.C. § 8126(a)(2), (b)(3) (Supp. IV 2016).
185. 42 C.F.R. § 136a.12 (2017).
186. 42 C.F.R. § 136a.12(a) (2017). Services may also be provided to a non-Indian woman pregnant
with an eligible Indian’s child for a certain time period, and to non-Indian members of an eligible Indian’s
household if the IHS determines that such care is necessary to control a public health hazard or an acute
infectious disease. Id. § 136a.12(b)(2)–(3). Other non-Indians may be provided direct care services by
the IHS in certain limited circumstances. See 25 U.S.C. § 1680c(a)–(b) (Supp. IV 2016) (outlining eligibility for direct health care services for children and spouses).
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and also requires either (1) residence within the United States and on a reservation located in a defined health care delivery area; or (2) residence within the
United States outside of the reservation but within a defined health care delivery
area and either (a) membership in the tribe or tribes located on that reservation
(or for which the reservation was established) or (b) maintenance of “close economic and social ties with that tribe or tribes.”187
As a general rule, tribal health programs must also make eligibility determinations for direct care and PRC subject to the IHS’s eligibility regulations.188
For direct care services, a tribal ISDEAA contractor would thus provide direct
care to “persons of Indian descent belonging to the Indian community served”
by that tribal program’s facilities.189 However, tribes operating their own health
care programs under an ISDEAA contract or compact are not required to follow
the IHS’s Open Door policy unless they specifically agree to do so.190
Further, under Section 813 of the IHCIA, as revised under the 2010 permanent reauthorization, tribes and tribal organizations operating under an ISDEAA
contract or compact can elect to serve non-beneficiaries (i.e., individuals who
would not otherwise be eligible for IHS services) based on a determination that
the provision of those services will not result in a denial or diminution of services
to eligible Indian beneficiaries.191 In making that determination, tribes and tribal
organizations can consider that payment could be required from such individuals
for services received. Indeed, it may make good business sense – as well as fill a
community need – for tribal health programs to serve non-beneficiaries as well
as tribal members and other IHS beneficiaries within their geographic area. Importantly, where a tribe decides to serve non-beneficiaries under a Section 813
resolution, the statute specifically provides that “Any services provided by the
Indian tribe or tribal organization pursuant to a determination made under this
subparagraph shall be deemed to be provided under the agreement entered into
by the Indian tribe or tribal organization under the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act.”192 This provision ensures that, so long as services to
187. 42 C.F.R. § 136.23(a) (2017). Other groups also have limited PRC eligibility, such as students
and transients, foster children and persons who leave their PRC health service delivery area. Id. §
136.23(b)–(d).
188. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100472, § 204, 102 Stat. 2285, 2291–92 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5324(g) (Supp. IV 2016)) (reclassifying Section 106 as Section 105); Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106260, § 517(e), 114 Stat. 711, 730 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5397(e) (Supp. IV 2016)).
189. 42 C.F.R. § 136.12(a) (2017). In situations of doubt as to whether a person is eligible for care,
the regulations allow for input from the Bureau of Indian Affairs about each individual’s “continuing
relationship to the Indian population served by the local program.” Id. § 136.12(b).
190. 25 U.S.C. § 5329(c) (Supp. IV 2016) (stating that the ISDEAA, tribal contractors are not bound
by IHS policies or guidance unless they specifically agree).
191. 25 U.S.C. § 1680c(c)(2) (Supp. IV 2016).
192. Id.
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non-beneficiaries are included in the tribe’s scope of work for its ISDEAA agreements, the tribe will not lose the benefits and protections otherwise available to
it under those agreements as a result of its sovereign decision to extend services
to non-Indians.
This authority for tribes to determine whether to serve non-beneficiaries in
the operation of tribal health programs without losing the benefits and protections
available under their ISDEAA contract is thus an existing example of how federal laws can support tribal health programs even when they extend beyond mere
implementation of a parallel federal program. The model—i.e., deeming those
services to be performed under an ISDEAA contract—is relatively straightforward under the existing legal framework, and could be applied elsewhere with
relatively minor adjustments to existing federal laws. The issue becomes more
complicated, however, where the tribe regulates but does not itself operate a
health care program or facility. As one example, Medicare and Medicaid laws
and regulations require that health care providers and facilities be state licensed
as a condition of reimbursement.193 Under the IHCIA, tribal health programs are
deemed to have met state licensing requirements for such purposes if they meet
all the applicable standards for licensure, regardless of whether they actually obtain the license.194 However, if a tribe licenses a non-tribal provider on tribal
lands and does not require parallel state licensing, Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements to that facility could be jeopardized. In some ways, then, existing
federal laws lag behind tribal innovation in the provision of health care to tribal
communities.
V. CASE STUDY: THE SWINOMISH TRIBE’S DENTAL THERAPIST PROGRAM
While there are ways to further strengthen the legal framework, there is a
strong basis for tribal self-regulation of health care in existing federal law—and
good reasons for tribes to take advantage. Indeed, Indian tribes are beginning to
implement self-regulation of health care services, through the exercise of inherent tribal sovereignty, in new and innovative ways to address pressing health
concerns that are not adequately addressed through existing federal programs or
that can be better implemented through tribal authority. In 2016, in a powerful
example of how tribal self-regulation can be used to address local community
needs while at the same time driving the evolution of state and federal law, the
Swinomish Indian Tribal Community became the first tribal community outside

193. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e)(7), (r), (aa)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 2016) (requiring that hospital providers and
other providers such as physicians and rural health clinics be state licensed for purposes of Medicare
reimbursement); 42 C.F.R. § 440.10(a)(3)(ii), (iii) (2017) (requiring that hospitals that provide inpatient
services be state licensed); Id. § 440.20(a)(3)(i), (ii) (requiring that hospitals that provide outpatient services be state licensed).
194. 25 U.S.C. § 1647a(a)(2) (Supp. IV 2016).
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of Alaska to employ a dental therapist to provide basic oral health services to
community members under a tribal licensing and regulatory scheme.195
Dental therapists are primary oral health care professionals who work under
the general supervision of a licensed dentist to provide basic clinical dental treatment and preventive services. Dental therapists have been providing such services within the Indian health care system in Alaska for many years—the Alaska
dental therapy program is part of the federally-authorized Community Health
Aide Program, which was initially created in Alaska over 50 years ago to respond
to poor health status in isolated, rural communities that lacked basic and preventive care,196 and is now operated under specific authority in the IHCIA.197 The
Alaska Community Health Aide Program includes dental health aide/therapists
as well as community health aide/practitioners and behavioral health aide/practitioners—all three classes of which are certified by the Alaska Community
Health Aide Program Certification Board (CHAPCB), a federally authorized and
created entity charged with maintaining training and practice standards and policies, as well as certification of training centers and individual health aides, for
the community health aide program in Alaska.198 In Alaska, there are five levels
of dental health aides: Primary Dental Health Aide levels 1 and 2, Expanded
Function Dental Health Aide levels 1 and 2, and dental health aide therapists
(DHATs).199 The training curriculum for DHATs includes education and practical experience components and takes three academic years completed over two
calendar years.200 The scope of practice for each type of dental health aide provider is different, but depending on their level of certification, dental health aides
can provide an array of services including diagnosis and treatment; basic hygiene; infection control; pediatric services; uncomplicated extractions; planning
and prevention; radiographs; restorative services; and urgent care, as well as
clinic management and equipment repair and maintenance.201 The certification

195. See infra notes 209–211 and accompanying text.
196. Sarah Shoffstall-Cone & Mary Williard, Alaska Dental Health Aide Program, INT’L J.
CIRCUMPOLAR HEALTH 1, 2 (2013), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3753165/pdf/IJCH72-21198.pdf.
197. See 25 U.S.C. § 1616l (Supp. IV 2016) (detailing the Community Health Aide Program).
198. See generally Community Health Aid Program Certification Board, ALASKA CMTY. HEALTH
AIDE PROGRAM, http://www.akchap.org/html/chapcb.html (last visited July 19, 2018) (displaying the services provided by the Alaska Community Health Aide Program).
199. See COMMUNITY HEALTH AIDE PROGRAM CERTIFICATION BOARD: STANDARDS AND
PROCEDURES,
§
1.20.010(16)
(2018),
http://www.akchap.org/resources/chap_library/CHAPCB_Documents/CHAPCB_Standards_Procedures_Amended_2018-01-25.pdf.
200. See id. §§ 2.30.600–2.30.610 (listing the dental health aide therapist educational and supervision
requirements).
201. See id. §§ 2.20.120–2.40.500 (detailing the scope of practice, training and education requirements
for various provider qualifications).
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program operated by the Alaska CHAPCB under the federal community health
aide program has been held to preempt Alaska state licensure requirements.202
When the Swinomish Tribe launched its dental therapist program, the state
of Washington did not allow for dental therapists or midlevel dental health services to be provided within the state.203 While federal law, as part of the 2010
amendment and reauthorization of the IHCIA, authorizes the expansion of the
Alaska Community Health Aide Program nation-wide, the IHCIA specifically
excludes DHAT services from such tribal programs unless the tribe or tribal organization is located in a state (other than Alaska) where DHAT services or midlevel dental health provider services are authorized under state law.204 The only
option for the Swinomish Tribe, at that time then, was to implement a dental
therapist program under its own sovereign authority.
The Swinomish Tribe saw a clear need for such a program. In announcing
the employment of the first dental therapist on the Swinomish Reservation, a
press release from the Tribe stated that “too many Swinomish Tribal members –
particularly children – [suffer] unnecessarily and potentially [face] life-threatening conditions because they lack access to dental care[.]”205 The press release
cited disturbing statistics on oral health in Indian Country:
Oral health research shows that historical traumas have caused Indians
to lead the nation in oral disease rates. By age five, 75 percent of
American Indians and Alaska Natives experience tooth decay. Recent
Federal statistics for Washington, Oregon and Idaho show that Indian
children suffer tooth decay at three times the national average. Lowdentist-to-patient ratios in Indian Country mean that many Indians
lack access to regular dental treatment and prevention services. Turnover among providers in Indian Country interrupts continuity of care
and inhibits the delivery of culturally competent services.206

202. Alaska Dental Soc’y v. Alaska Native Tribal Health Consortium, No. 3:06-cv-00039 JWS, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44263 at *12–14 (D. Alaska June 28, 2006).
203. See Julie Ralston Aoki et al., Maximizing Community Voices to Address Health Inequities: How
the Law Hinders and Helps, 45 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 11, 12–13 (2017) (discussing the decision by the
Swinomish Tribe to act in the absence of Washington law authorizing DHATs).
204. See 25 U.S.C. § 1616l(d)(3) (Supp. IV 2016) (highlighting the rule for electing an Indian tribe or
tribal organization).
205. Press Release, Swinomish Indian Tribal Cmty., Swinomish Become First Tribe in Lower 48 to
Use Dental Therapists to Address Oral Health Crisis in Indian Country (Jan. 4, 2016),
http://www.swinomish-nsn.gov/media/49613/20160104-pressrelease-swinomishhirefirstdentalhealthaidetherapist.pdf.
206. See id. (citing KATHY R. PHIPPS & TIMOTHY L. RICKS, THE ORAL HEALTH OF AMERICAN INDIAN
AND ALASKA NATIVE CHILDREN AGED 1-5 YEARS: RESULTS OF THE 2014 IHS ORAL HEALTH SURVEY
1–2, 5 (Indian Health Serv., Div. of Oral Health 2015), https://www.ihs.gov/doh/documents/IHS_Data_Brief_1-5_Year-Old.pdf.
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The Tribe’s Chairman said of the dental therapist program, “We have developed
a tribal approach to solve a tribal issue. This solution will help our people immediately address their oral health needs in ways that have not been possible until
today.”207
The Swinomish Tribe’s dental therapist program was patterned after the
Alaska Area DHAT program and designed to improve access to quality dental
health services within the Tribe’s community.208 The Tribe enacted its own dental provider licensure code that establishes a Dental Health Provider Licensing
Board and sets the Tribe’s own dental health provider licensing qualifications
and standards that must be met in order to obtain and maintain a tribal license,
not only for tribally-hired DHATs, but other of the Tribe’s dental providers as
well, such as its dentists and dental hygienists.209 The Swinomish Dental Health
Provider Licensing Code not only covers qualifications and standards for licensure, but also addresses continuing education requirements; discipline, suspension and revocation of the licenses; enforcement of the Licensing Board’s decisions; and the right of licensees to appeal the denial of a license application or
disciplinary action to the Swinomish Tribal Court and Swinomish Tribal Court
of Appeals.210
The Tribe created the Swinomish Dental Health Provider Licensing Code
under the authority of the Tribe’s constitution and bylaws, its inherent tribal sovereign authority as a federally-recognized Indian tribe, and the rights reserved to
the Tribe in the “Treaty of Point Elliott.”211 In adopting the code, the Tribe made
several findings, not only about the Tribe’s sovereign “right and responsibility
to promote, protect and improve the health and welfare of its members, and to
enhance the quality of the lives of all of its members by providing a combination
of economic opportunities and a safety net of social services,”212 but also based
on documentary evidence of the poor quality of dental health among native children and adults and the significant dental health improvements made in Alaska
under the Alaska DHAT program.213 Moreover, it was important to the Tribe that
the Tribe’s own dental clinic “provide the highest quality dental services in the

207. Id; see also Aoki et al., supra note 203, at 13 (describing benefits realized since implementation
of the Swinomish DHAT program, including decreased patient wait times and the ability of all levels of
dental providers within the Tribe’s program “to focus their skills and expertise more efficiently – to work
at the top of their licenses.”).
208. SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL COMMUNITY DENTAL HEALTH PROVIDER LICENSING AND
STANDARDS CODE § 15-11.040(G)–(J), (N), (Q) (2017).
209. Id. §§ 15-11.070, 15-11.100.
210. Id. §§ 15-11.070 to 15-11.360.
211. Id. § 15-11.030.
212. Id. § 15-11.040(A).
213. See id. § 15-11.040(C)–(F), (H)–(I) (highlighting the success ANTHC has experienced through
the implementation of their DHAT program).
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most culturally competent manner[.]”214 To that end, all dental health aides, dentists, dental hygienists, and dental therapists licensed by the Tribe must demonstrate that they possess “formal education, training, and/or personal or professional experience that would be reasonably expected to result in cultural
competency.”215 This provision, which reflects uniquely tribal priorities and has
no parallel in state licensing requirements, serves to ensure that providers practicing in the tribal community are meeting tribal needs. Since 2015, the Swinomish Division of Licensing has licensed dental health providers practicing at the
Swinomish Dental Clinic, and in 2016, the Division licensed its first certified
DHAT who is now providing services at the Tribe’s clinic and within its community.216
The Tribe also adopted a tribal tort claims code to govern procedures for
individuals who may be injured by tortious acts or omissions of the Tribe, its
officers or employees in carrying out the scope of their duties or employment,
and to seek compensation for the injury.217 The Tribe’s Tort Claims Code provides for a limited waiver of tribal sovereign immunity for anyone who believes
they are injured by the Tribe’s licensed dental providers (or otherwise by tribal
officers, employees or agents, including tribal police officers) to file a claim for
monetary damages in tribal court.218 The Tort Claims Code limits monetary damages to the amount of funds available through the Tribe’s insurance coverage.219
The broad scope of the Tribe’s Dental Health Provider Licensing Code and
its Tort Claims Code was driven in part by the need to substitute for non-existent
state law, to help head-off and minimize potential risk that the Tribe’s state-licensed dentists would be accused of conducting the unlawful practice of dentistry and violating their dental licenses by supervising otherwise un-licensed
DHATs. As it turned out, the Swinomish Tribe was simply ahead of the curve in
the development of state law: as of July 23, 2017, Washington Substitute Senate
Bill 5079 authorizes DHAT services as part of on-reservation tribal health programs within Washington State. Under this Washington law, DHAT services
must be provided by a person who is “certified” as a DHAT by a federal community health aide certification board (i.e., the CHAPCB) or by “[a] federally
recognized Indian tribe that has adopted certification standards that meet or exceed the requirements of a federal community health aide program certification

214.
215.
216.
217.
(2015).
218.
219.

Id. § 15-11.040(N).
Id. §§ 15-11.150(G), 15-11.160(C), 15-170(C), 15-11.171(B).
Id. § 15-11.040(O)–(P).
See generally SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL COMMUNITY TORT CLAIMS CODE tit. 03, ch. 08
Id. § 3-08.060(A).
Id. § 3-08.060(D).
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board.”220 The Swinomish Tribe’s dental licensure program, which was already
tribally designed to “meet or exceed” the CHAPCB certification requirements,
is thus now also expressly consistent with the authorized certification of DHATs
under Washington State law.
As a result of the success of Swinomish’s new DHAT program and the authorization of DHAT services in Washington and other states,221 other tribal
health programs have expressed a desire to hire, train and certify DHATs to work
for their own tribal health programs—many such individuals have been hired and
are currently undergoing the two-year DHAT training program in Alaska.222
However, not all of these tribes have been interested in developing and replicating the same comprehensive certification scheme put into place by Swinomish,
as that could be resource intensive and cost prohibitive, create delays in being
able to hire DHATs to begin providing services as quickly as possible, and create
an environment for overlapping infrastructure and inconsistent regional implementation. Instead, some of these tribes are considering a different way of exercising their sovereign authority to self-regulate, by entering into intergovernmental agreements with the Swinomish Tribe pursuant to which the Swinomish
Tribe’s certification program will serve as a region-wide certifying entity for all
tribal DHATs within Indian country in the states of Oregon and Washington, for
any such tribes who choose to have their DHATs licensed by Swinomish.223 Licensed DHATs may then carry out DHAT services within the tribal dental program that employs them, consistent with the Swinomish licenses.224

220. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.350.020 (2017). The law also requires that all of the DHAT services be
performed as part of an Indian health program within the boundaries of an Indian reservation, and be
provided in accordance with the certification standards and pursuant to any applicable written standing
orders by a supervising dentist. Id. Under the Washington law, the DHAT services may be provided only
to members of federally recognized tribes or anyone else who is “eligible for services under Indian health
service criteria” pursuant to the IHCIA. Id.
221. The state of Oregon has also approved an “Oregon Tribes Dental Health Aide Therapist Pilot Project,” which is authorized through 2021. ORE. HEALTH AUTH. CTR. FOR PREVENTION & HEALTH
PROMOTION, DENTAL PILOT PROJECT PROGRAM, DENTAL PILOT PROJECT #100, OREGON TRIBES DENTAL
HEALTH AIDE THERAPIST PILOT PROJECT (2017), http://www.oregon.gov/oha/ph/PreventionWellness/oralhealth/DentalPilotProjects/Documents/100-abstract.pdf.
222. Id. at 4; DHAT Attracts Lower 48 Trainees, RASMUSON FOUND. (July 28, 2015), www.rasmuson.org/news/dhat-attracts-lower-48-trainees/.
223. SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL COMMUNITY DENTAL HEALTH PROVIDER LICENSING AND
STANDARDS CODE § 15-11.020 (2017) (indicating that the purpose of this code is to “regulate dental health
providers to protect the health, safety and welfare of the Tribe and its members, as well as the health,
safety and welfare of tribal members of other federally recognized tribes in Washington and Oregon whose
dental health providers are licensed by the Tribe under this chapter[.]”).
224. Native Dental Therapy Initiative, NW. PORTLAND AREA INDIAN HEALTH BD.,
http://www.npaihb.org/dhat-news-item-goes-here/ (last visited July 9, 2018). This approach is comparable in many ways to efforts by states to streamline multi-state licensure for medical professionals through
interstate compacts adopted and implemented through state legislation. See, e.g., States Enact Interstate
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To implement this arrangement, the Swinomish Dental Health Provider Licensing Code now authorizes the Tribe’s Division of Licensing and Dental
Health Provider Licensing Board to license, oversee and discipline DHATs and
other dental providers who are licensed by the Tribe but employed by other dental health programs of federally recognized tribes in Washington and Oregon
state.225 Under the Code, the dental provider must be an employee of a comprehensive tribal dental health program, and the tribe in question must enter into a
Memorandum of Agreement with the Swinomish Tribe agreeing to the Swinomish Tribe’s oversight and disciplinary authority over the providers it licenses.226
Licensees and their tribal employers must submit to the Swinomish Tribe’s licensing-related authorities, including agreeing to comply with the Swinomish
Dental Health Provider Licensing Code and, specifically, with the authority of
the Swinomish Tribal Court and the Swinomish Tribal Court of Appeals.227
Tribes who wish to have their dental providers licensed by Swinomish must have
their own tribal law in place prohibiting anyone from providing services as a
DHAT without a valid license, and requiring licenses to be maintained in good
standing.228 DHATs licensed by Swinomish and employed by other tribal programs must “provide only certain dental services in accordance with his or her
Swinomish license and applicable state law, and will be supervised by a licensed
dentist who . . . will provide the other, higher levels of dental care to the tribe’s
patients.”229
This exercise of inherent tribal sovereign authority among tribal governments has a strong potential for creating greater efficiency through consolidation
of resources and expertise available to all tribes; consistency in implementation
of DHAT programs throughout the region leading to better cooperation, identification and implementation of best practices; and reciprocity among different
tribal programs. And now, this approach—shaped by tribes seeking to use their
sovereign authority in a creative manner to effectively and efficiently address
tribal needs—is supported by Washington State law, which recognizes that certification of DHATs for practice at tribal health programs can be carried out by
a federally recognized Indian tribe that has adopted the appropriate certification
standards. In this way, the exercise of tribal self-regulation in this instance has
served not only to increase and improve services for tribal people throughout the
region, but to drive advancements in state law as well.
Medical Licensure Compact and Trigger Commission, AM. DENTAL EDUC. ASS’N (June 10, 2015),
http://www.adea.org/Blog.aspx?id=27399&blogid=20132.
225. SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL COMMUNITY DENTAL HEALTH PROVIDER LICENSING AND
STANDARDS CODE § 15-11.370 (2017).
226. Id. §§ 15-11.370, 15-11.410.
227. Id. § 15-11.370(A), (B)(1).
228. Id. § 15-11.370(B)(4).
229. Id. § 15-11.370(B)(7).

2018]

TRIBAL SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY

157

VI. CONCLUSION
Existing federal programs and state laws regulating the health care field do
not always meet local tribal needs. Where possible under the existing legal
framework, tribal self-regulation of health care programs and services on tribal
lands can offer solutions to fill the gaps, resulting in better health outcomes in
local tribal communities while also developing and exercising tribal governing
capacity. At the same time, tribal self-regulation can benefit non-Indian communities by driving innovation in health care policy at the state and federal level
and, in some cases, increasing the availability of services even to non-Indians at
the local level.
This process is already underway in some tribal communities, like Swinomish and other tribes in the Northwest implementing DHAT programs and services
to address their dental health needs. Undoubtedly, tribes will increasingly opt to
follow this path as they outgrow the existing self-determination model of tribal
implementation of federal health care programs and services, relying to an even
greater degree on inherent tribal authority as well as tribal expertise and creative
problem-solving abilities to improve access to quality health care for Indian people. Support for these tribally driven efforts is consistent with the federal trust
responsibility and government-to-government relationship underlying modern
federal Indian law, and—most importantly—shows great promise for improving
the health and wellbeing of tribal communities.

